Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla

I. General Introduction

1. General Introduction – Introducing Love into Love

In his *Introduction to the First Edition* of *Love and Responsibility*, Karol Wojtyla wrote of “a problem which can be described as that of ‘introducing love into love’.”¹ He went on to specify his meaning:

The word as first used in that phrase signifies the love which is the subject of the greatest commandment, while in its second use it means all that takes shape between man and woman on the basis of the sexual urge. (*LR* 17)

He goes on to say:

We could look at it the other way round and say that there exists a problem of changing the second type of love (sexual love) into the first, the love of which the New Testament speaks. (*LR* 17)

Needless to say, our author was not unaware of the fact that the love of the greatest commandment is not a purely human love. It is rather a human love that has been divinized: “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (*Rm* 5:5).² From this we can conclude that our author, in fact, wanted to show how charity is introduced into sexual love.

Charity, as is obvious from *The Letter to the Romans*, is a participation in the love of the Blessed Trinity. Our conclusion is simple: Karol Wojtyla’s initial ambition implies discovering how Trinitarian love could be reflected or echoed in married and sexual love.

In a catechesis on *charity*, given in 1999, Pope John Paul II spoke of the relationship between charity, human love and the practice of the virtues. The practice of married chastity is not explicitly mentioned, but is obviously included:

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² All quotations from Sacred Scripture will be taken from the *Revised Standard Version*, London 1966, unless accompanied by the abbreviation *JB*, which indicates that the given quotation has been taken from *The Jerusalem Bible*, London 1966.
The ability to love as God loves is offered to every Christian as a fruit of the paschal mystery of his [Christ’s] Death and Resurrection. The Church has expressed this sublime reality by teaching that charity is a theological virtue, which means a virtue that refers directly to God and enables human creatures to enter the circuit of Trinitarian love.³

Through charity man enters “the circuit of Trinitarian love.” The obvious question that comes to mind at the beginning of this thesis is: can sexual love enter into this circuit of Trinitarian love? Can the sexual act performed in marriage be an expression of the charity by which we participate in Trinitarian love? Pope John Paul II believes it can, and we believe that this is based on his profound conviction that, after having created man as male and female, “God saw everything that he had make, and behold, it was very good” (Gn 1:31).

That sexual love can enter “the circuit of Trinitarian love” is clearly implied in the above mentioned catechesis on charity in which he quotes from the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

Through the power of the Holy Spirit, charity shapes the moral activity of the Christian; it directs and strengthens all the other virtues, which build up the new man within us. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church says: “The practice of all the virtues is animated and inspired by charity, which ‘binds everything together in perfect harmony’ (Col 3:14); it is the form of the virtues; it articulates and orders them among themselves; it is the source and the goal of their Christian practice. Charity upholds and purifies our human ability to love, and raises it to the supernatural perfection of divine love” (n. 1827). As Christians, we are always called to love.⁴

Charity “directs and strengthens all the other virtues,” and this obviously includes the virtue of chastity. With the Catechism, the Pope tells us that the “practice of all the virtues is animated and inspired by charity.” Charity is both “the source and the goal of their Christian practice.” This implies that not only virtues as qualities of the human soul, but also acts of virtue are based on charity and have charity as their end.

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The marriage act is an act of chastity. It is, therefore, based on charity and has charity as its goal. Karol Wojtyla told us that he wanted to introduce love into love. Now as Pope, and using the *Universal Catechism*, he tells us: “Charity upholds and purifies our human ability to love, and raises it to the supernatural perfection of divine love.” Acts of chastity within marriage, and these include the sexual act, have therefore been raised “to the supernatural perfection of divine love.” The last words of this catechism, “we are always called to love,” can therefore be directed to married couples even during marriage intimacy.

One could of course say that all this is simply age-old Catholic doctrine. The Church has always maintained that the marriage act is meritorious if performed in the state of grace. What then is original in Pope Wojtyla’s approach? One could say that his emphasis is new, but it seems that he gives to the traditional doctrine a new formulation and, so to speak, hammers the final nail into the coffin of Manichaeism. By tracing the origin of married love back to the *communio personarum* of the Blessed Trinity, he will show us the deepest roots of all authentic expressions of married love.

2. Introduction to Overall Plan

As this is foreseen as the first in a series of articles, we will now give a brief overview of how we plan to develop our theme, i.e., of how we understand Pope Wojtyla’s efforts to introduce love into love.

In this first article we will try to come to a clear understanding of our author’s philosophy and theology of love. While giving due attention to ideas such as love as attraction, love as desire and eros, we will pay special attention to love as goodwill and to our author’s idea of disinterestedness. Here we will see a need to base the love as goodwill, which we have for others, on the love as goodwill, which we have for ourselves. While recognising the value of affirming that love as goodwill is altruistic, we will try to show that, in the most profound sense, this love is most immediately self-interested, i.e. the greatest goods that we will for other persons are necessarily willed most immediately for ourselves.

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5 This series of articles is based on my doctoral thesis, *Conjugal Chastity in Pope Wojtyla*, which was defended at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas, Rome, on the 17th of May, 2007.

6 This corresponds to the first chapter of our thesis.
Our second article will be dedicated to *Justice towards The Creator*. Here we will see that, whereas in *Love and Responsibility* justice was seen to be more basic than love, as Pope, our author clearly taught that love is more basic than justice. Love is, therefore, the deepest foundation of all human action, including human action within the conjugal life. We will then dedicate space to understanding Wojtyła’s *personalistic norm*. Having explained the positive dimension of this norm – man’s right to be loved, we will offer a critique of the negative dimension of this norm. It seems unfortunate to us that Wojtyla was not more critical of the *second categorical imperative* of Kant. A more critical appraisal would, we believe, have given Wojtyła’s approach a more solid basis.

In our third article we will look at conjugal love. To understand what *goods* the spouses will or desire for each other in marriage, we will first look to the ends of marriage as a state. This will enable us to see what is specific to *conjugal love* as compared to *love* in its more simple form. For a more complete vision of conjugal love, it will be necessary to explain the idea of *communio personarum*. This, in turn, will allow us to begin to see how married love reflects the interior life of the Trinity. Conjugal love is a truly human love. For this reason it will be necessary to explain what our author calls the *spousal meaning of the body*.

The *spousal meaning of the human body*, i.e. its capacity to express love, serves as an introduction to *a theology of the conjugal act*. This will be the subject a fourth article. While giving due attention to concepts such as *the sexual urge, emotion* and *tenderness*, we will try to explain and highlight the relationship that exists between the two meanings of the conjugal act, namely, between the unitive and the procreative dimensions of this act.

Our firth and last article will deal with conjugal chastity, i.e. with that virtue which allows the married couple to live love in sexual intimacy. This chapter will also include an explanation of the role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit as related to conjugal chastity.

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7 This corresponds to the second chapter of our thesis.  
8 The personalistic norm was treated of in the third chapter of our thesis.  
9 This corresponds to the fourth chapter of our thesis.  
10 This corresponds to the fifth chapter of our thesis.  
11 This corresponds to the sixth chapter of our thesis.
II. Towards a Theology of Love

1. Love in the Early Writings of Karol Wojtyla

The first doctoral dissertation of Karol Wojtyla was presented at the Angelicum in 1947. While the principal object of this thesis was *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*, the last chapter of his *Analysis* offers some very useful doctrine on love. In talking about the soul that is already well advanced in the spiritual life he writes:

Since its will is perfectly united with God, it cannot act otherwise than does the divine will. Consequently, because of the perfection of the transforming union, the will is constantly and solely occupied in the same thing as the divine will, namely, loving God and giving to him by its love that which it has by participation – God himself. Moreover, the soul does this not only with a loving will but in a divine mode, since it is under the impetus of the Holy Spirit.12

As this human will “is constantly and solely occupied in the same thing as the divine will, namely, loving God,” we see clearly that God loves Himself. It is also clear that the human soul, “under the impetus of the Holy Spirit,” loves God with the love with which God loves Himself. The Scriptural foundation of this is seen in Romans. As Supreme Pontiff, our author will teach:

In the Christian’s soul there is a *new love* by which he shares in God’s own love: “The love of God”, says St. Paul, “has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us” (Rom 5:5). This love is divine in nature, and so is higher than the connatural abilities of the human soul. In theological terminology it is called *charity*.13

Here it is of utmost importance to remember that God’s love is one, and that when the Christian soul receives this love he thereby participates in the love that God has for Himself, but also in the love that God has for all men. The obvious conclusion is that the human person in the state of grace also participates in the love that God has for him or herself. He or she can therefore state: *I love myself with the love with which God loves me*, and, in virtue of that self-same love, he can also say: *I love my neighbour with God’s own love.*


In the early writings of Wojtyla there seems to be no fear of talking of loving oneself with what seems to be love of goodwill. It should however be noted that the references that will follow are not taken from what we would call the “original Wojtyla,” but from his Lublin Lectures, where his main task was to explain the thought of others. In his lectures on Good and Value he stated:

If, therefore, the good man strives after that which is an objectively true good, after that which is not just his good, but simply the absolute good, Aristotle concedes, as a consequence, that this man must possess self-love.14

Wojtyla offers no criticism of this position of Aristotle, which is based on the Nicomachean Ethics. In fact, he goes on to corroborate it when he exposes Aristotle’s doctrine contained in The Greater Ethics:

For only the man, for whom anything, that is good in itself, is a good, is a fully honest man, and none of these goods will corrupt him and he will be irritated by none of them. Therefore, only in the case of such a man can one speak about true self-love, for within him there is no conflict between the individual faculties of the soul.15

These positions of Aristotle, which Wojtyla leaves uncriticised in his 1955/56 lectures, would seem to leave no doubt about the possibility of speaking of love of self in a positive way. The desiring of, or striving after true goods, is looked on as an expression of true self-love.

This, as we see when we turn to his articles of 1957/58, does not seem to reflect Wojtyla’s own way of thinking. He will write: “The one who loves can desire the good without limits for himself – such a phenomenon is improperly called love as it is only desire.”16 He will further refine this distinction in Love and Responsibility where he states that love as desire refers to the goods we legitimately desire for ourselves (cf. LR 80-82) and love as goodwill refers to willing the good for others (cf. LR 82-84).

2. Disinterestedness in the Early Writings of Wojtyla

For Wojtyla the themes of love and disinterestedness are closely linked. This was clearly expressed in a 1957 article: “Love excludes interest, it is disinterested in its very essence, and it is so in a more absolute way than is justice.”\textsuperscript{17} The close connection of these themes justifies treating the themes of interestedness and disinterestedness within the context of this present chapter.

a) An Implicit Doctrine on True Self-Interest

It seems to us that the second doctoral thesis of Karol Wojtyla, which he completed in 1954, shows how the human person can exercise true self-interest. This becomes clear when our author expounds the doctrine of the Church, which condemns the opinion that it is morally evil to do the good only for the sake of eternal happiness and to avoid the evil only for the sake of avoiding eternal damnation:

The Council of Trent has condemned the opinions according to which to orientate oneself only in consideration of the reward, as the motive of good actions, is morally evil and [it also condemned the opinion according to which] to orientate oneself only on the basis of the fear of eternal punishment, as a motive for avoiding evil actions, is morally evil (cf. DS 818 and 841). Through this stance the Church teaches that the hope of the supernatural reward and the fear of eternal punishment are ethically good motives of action.\textsuperscript{18}

Here we see that it is morally possible to avoid bad acts only for the sake of avoiding eternal damnation and it is also licit to do good with the sole motive of gaining heaven. These motives are not the most perfect, but those who condemn them are, in fact, condemned by the Church.

This shows us that we can, in fact, speak of having a true interest in oneself or, as the English expression says, of taking one’s own best interests to heart. This is not contrary to love. In fact, it represents true love for oneself. If God is “interested” in my happiness, I ought to participate in this “divine interest.” Such true interest in oneself seems to be reflected


in words that our author would write in 1994: “Is not hell in a certain sense the ultimate safeguard of man’s moral conscience?”

b) Wojtyla’s More Explicit Teaching on Disinterestedness

Karol Wojtyla’s thought can be complex. It seems to us that it requires a very attentive reading. Such a reading reveals, as we will especially see in our analysis of The Acting Person, that true self-love and true self-interest must come before interest in others and love for others.

However, on the other hand, our author seems to condemn all self-interest by saying that love as goodwill is “uncompromisingly altruistic” and that, “Goodwill is quite free of self-interest” (LR 83). Nowhere does he, to our knowledge, give a substantial explanation of what we could call true self-interest.

Here we could add that his idea of disinterestedness can be given a Scriptural basis. In May 1991 our author, as Holy Father, and with the help of St. Paul, explained some of the essential characteristics of charity. Within this context he said that “Love ... does not seek its own interests, ...” (1 Cor 13:4-7). It seems, however, that this must be understood as referring to temporal and not to eternal or spiritual goods such as virtue and truly virtuous action. We will return to this theme later in this series of articles.

1) Disinterestedness in his Evaluation of Max Scheler

After this introduction we will now look in more detail to Wojtyla’s development of the idea of disinterestedness. We already encounter an important affirmation in his thesis on Max Scheler:

Jesus Christ only reveals the existence of an eternal reward and of eternal punishment and recommends that we take it into account in our comportment. But we already know from our preceding analysis that “taking something into account” does not, in fact, mean the same as “having it as an end.”


This is the first passage where Wojtyla seems to indicate that eternal happiness should not be so much an end of our actions but more a consequence that we accept. We do not aim at the reward; rather we accept it.

Personalistic ethics means that we strive for the ideal of Christian perfection, a perfection that man should realise through his actions: “Christian ethics proposes clearly the ideal of personal perfection, which man should realise through his acts.” Eternal reward is seen as a crowning or prolongation of personalistic ethics:

In this way the moral good ... is crowned by the vision of God face-to-face in the state of the blessed. . . . The doctrine of reward and punishment is in the prolongation of the personalistic premises of revealed religious ethics.3

From these quotations it seems, that in the view of Wojtyla, we should aim at perfection and accept the reward. Eternal happiness is not seen as the first principle of personalistic ethics. Moral perfection occupies this place. Eternal happiness is seen rather as an extension or prolongation of this perfection. It is something that we believe will be added, but it is not seen as the principal motive of our actions.

2) Wojtyla’s Article on The Problem of Disinterestedness

From 1954 we now move into the year 1957, where Wojtyla developed this theme in a more explicit form in an article entitled The Problem of Disinterestedness:

One can say with total certainty that final justice is in the interest of man and of humanity. However, no one can say that the man who accepts it [final justice] is, for this reason, interested. In this respect we are dealing with an “interest” that does not nullify the “disinterest” of man.

Effectively, justice in itself represents something that is disinterested, because one of its properties is to be above all interest. The man who allows himself to be guided by justice feels a need of this, recognises its objective greatness and thereby offers, for this reason, a proof of his substantial disinterest: he places himself above all interest or advantage and maintains himself within that which is objectively just.4

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24 K. Wojtyla, Il problema del disinteresse, in: Educazione all’amore, 86. English
In these two paragraphs he does not explain in what sense “final justice is in the interest of man.” This, we feel, would have given us an important hermeneutical key.

We should also add that the normal person understands justice to be very closely connected with his own best interests. A man who signs a contract to build a house thinks very much of his own interests. He is primarily interested in earning his own living and interests himself in the house of the other to the extent that, by doing so, he can earn his own living. It is, therefore, very difficult to take literally the affirmation that one of the properties of justice is to be above all interest.

However, the very last sentence of the passage quoted seems to allow for true interest in oneself: the just man “maintains himself within that which is objectively just.” This obviously allows for personal advantages which are just. It can, therefore, be argued that Wojtyla allows for true self-interest and only desires to criticise unjust self-seeking. The precise problem would therefore be injustice.

He then goes on to talk of utilitarian attitudes and also applies them to eternal life:

It is necessary to add that the man who renders all goods utilitarian, including this earthly life and even eternal life, loses a lot.

The true “interest” of man consists in guaranteeing to the good, in human living, feeling and acting, the characteristic of disinterestedness that the good contains in itself.\(^5\)

We have already suggested that the thought of Karol Wojtyla is complex. The particular article, now under scrutiny, gives ample proof of this. However, this article seems to us to be in harmony with his overall philosophical-theological view, which places the perfection of the human person and of human action as the most basic premise. Here this is expressed as guaranteeing “to the good” of “human living, feeling and acting” the “characteristic of disinterestedness.”

For Wojtyla, disinterestedness is, in fact, a property of the good: “The characteristic of disinterestedness that the good contains in itself.” Now as the “absolute good is identified as God,”\(^6\) we could conclude that


God is disinterested. Obviously He is not disinterested in humanity, but can be considered disinterested in the sense of not creating for His own advantage, of not creating in order to achieve some new perfection for Himself.

God, in turn, guarantees the disinterestedness of our human action. From this it seems possible to conclude that we should be interested in the advantages of others and not our own. In acting, we should not directly will our own perfection. This combines with the altruistic interpretation that Wojtyla will give to love as goodwill, which is the “purest form of love” (LR 83).

The article now under consideration goes on to affirm that in general man is inclined to interpret the doctrine of the Gospel about reward for good action and punishment for evil action in the spirit of utilitarianism. Wojtyla next introduces the opposition between love and calculation:

Man would want, from the point of view of his own egoism, to calculate the reward with minimum loss; with similar calculation he would want to avoid punishment.

This “interested” interpretation of the truth about reward and eternal punishment ... is not in accord with the Gospel. The Gospel, in fact, indicates to us the way to the reward as being love and not, therefore, calculation. Because love excludes interest, it is disinterested in its very essence, and it is so in a more absolute way than is justice.

One could ask, why one could not in a spirit of true self-love and true self-interest “calculate” the maximum reward with the least possible loss? Does not God, in His great love for us, desire that we gain the greatest possible reward with the least possible suffering? And do we not participate in the love with which God loves us?

We could also ask, is Wojtyla’s opposition to “calculation” based on trying to obtain the maximum reward with the minimum loss, or is it based on pride and the consequent desire to be in control that often manifests itself in an excessive desire to calculate results? Such excessive desire

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27 Cf. id., ibidem: “soltanto lui [Dio] garantisce il disinteresse delle azioni umane”.

28 Cf. id., ibidem: “l’uomo è in genere incline ad interpretare la dottrina del Vangelo circa il premio per la vita onesta e la punizione per la vita disonestà, nello spirito dell’utilitarismo.”

to be in control is but a concrete manifestation of pride, wherein lies the true problem to which Wojtyla’s intuition seems to point.

For the sake of completeness we will quote and briefly comment on the last two paragraphs of the present article:

Does interest exist in Christian morality? It is difficult to respond that it does not exist. However, it would be exaggerated to sustain that such interest, in its formation, follows only along the lines of “interests” in the next life. Such would also be an insult, but we do not need to take it [such an interpretation] into account.

However, if in the soul of the Christian there lies hidden such a utilitarian interpretation of the truth of final justice, he ought to overcome it, be it in theory, be it in practice: the Gospel obliges him to battle for disinterestedness.  

Here Wojtyla makes the very pertinent observation that the Christian cannot only be interested in the next life. To accuse Christian morality of only having such an orientation would, in fact, be an insult. The article, therefore, closes by implicitly accepting that we can be “interested” in future glory, but that this should not have the effect of making us indifferent to the development of this world.

Andrew Woznicki, in his explanation of the Foundations of Christian Agapology according to Wojtyla, speaks of “true love, as an other-oriented motive power for ‘self-fulfillment.’” True love, it would seem, is orientated not towards oneself, but towards others. But through this love we actually fulfil ourselves.

With specific reference to the article now under our consideration Woznicki writes: “Finally, every genuine love is completely disinterested: ‘Love excludes self-interest; love is disinterested in its very essence; it is even more unconditionally disinterested than justice.’” Woznicki reflects the overall view of Wojtyla that seems to say that self-interest does not enter into the highest form of love. However, as we will see in the next article which appeared in the Tygodnik Powszechny series, Wojtyla does talk of true self-interest.

3) Wojtyla’s Article on The Doctrine of Happiness

The next article that deals with this theme states that man’s tendency to happiness is an objective interest, which results from the natural tendency of the human being. Such interests do not clash with disinterest:

The objective interests of man, which are the interests that do not clash with disinterestedness, as they result from the tendencies of the human being, from all that which in human nature is most certainly healthy, should be placed within the limits of disinterestedness, as established by justice and love.33

Here we have a very clear affirmation that the “objective interests of man” can be desired and sought in a way that does not contradict “disinterestedness, as established by justice and love.” This language might sound complicated, but it seems clear, from this particular passage, that man can strive towards that which is indicated by his truly natural tendencies.

Wojtyla goes on to expressly mention our tendency to happiness as a natural desire.34 He affirms that “man wants happiness in everything and through everything.”35 This could, of course, be interpreted to mean that through disinterestedness man is really seeking his own happiness. In other words: a “disinterested spirit” ought to be cultivated for the sake of one’s own best interests. This, however, does not seem to be the intention of our author, who places objective interestedness within the limits of disinterestedness and not vice versa.

He then states that happiness is not a way, but is the end of all the ways of man.36 Happiness is reached through moral perfection, but it ought not to be bought “at the price” of perfection.37 This same point is reiterated in the following words: “In fact, one cannot say that man buys happiness to the detriment of morality: one can only buy material things.”38 In these passages our author seems to say that moral effort should be disinterested

34 Cf. ibidem.
36 Cf. ibidem, 92: “La felicità invece non è una via, ma è il fine d’ogni via del-l’uomo.”
37 Cf. K. Wojtyła, La dottrina della felicità, in: Educazione all’amore, 92: “La felicità invece... si acquista mediante la perfezione. Ma non può esser comprata «al prezzo» della perfezione.”
38 Ibidem, 93. English translation mine.
in the sense that such moral effort should not be made for the sake of reaching happiness. Happiness should not be aimed at through moral effort. This confirms our interpretation that happiness is not to be aimed at, but is to be simply accepted.

In this particular article Wojtyla expresses a certain aversion to the image of buying eternal happiness at a price. However, in his article on The Primacy of Spiritual Values he uses a similar image in a very positive manner. He states that man is conscious that values that give more to him from the objective point of view, should cost him more subjectively. He continues by saying that “those that cost more are certainly superior values.” With specific reference to spiritual values he says: “Certainly, they cost more to man, but they make him penetrate more profoundly into the objective good.”

We see no contradiction between these two articles. The basic message of the first is that we should not make moral effort, i.e. pay the price, in order to obtain happiness. In other words, we do not pay the price in order to reach the end, which is happiness. The basic message of the second article is that we should be willing to pay the price that is involved in gaining a spiritual value. We should, for example, be willing to pay the price of our own perfection, but we do not pay the price for the sake of obtaining happiness. Happiness, as we have seen, and as we will see, is to be accepted rather than aimed at. This will become clearer when, later, we turn our attention to L’uomo nel campo della responsabilità. However, we now turn to Wojtyla’s doctrine of love and disinterestedness in Love and Responsibility.

3. Love and Disinterestedness in Love and Responsibility

a) Love as Attraction

The first kind of love that Wojtyla explains in depth is love as attraction (LR 74-80). A close reading of this section will reveal that this kind of love
involves being acted on or being influenced by the goodness or beauty of the other. If John attracts Mary, this means that Mary is attracted by John. In other words, John’s goodness has had an influence on Mary, so that she now desires John. Attraction is therefore the basis of desire.

In the first paragraph Wojtyla states that attraction is based on the sexual urge: “That the two parties so easily attract each other is the result of the sexual urge.” This urge, however, ought to be “raised to the personal level” (LR 74). While at “the base of attraction [there] is a sense impression,” this is not decisive for Wojtyla. The human will must play its part: “To be attracted ... means a commitment to think of that person as a certain good, and such a commitment can in the last resort be effected only by the will” (LR 75). For Wojtyla, the sense impression, the emotions, knowledge and the will are all involved in love as attraction.

He next goes on to talk about sensibility and defines it as “the ability to react to a perceived good of a particular kind” (LR 75-76). The kind of good to which a given person will react depends on that particular person. Some, for example, will react more strongly to “sensual and sexual values,” others “to spiritual and moral values, intelligence, virtue, etc.” (LR 77). However:

All these values to which a person responds derive from the object of the attraction. The subject of the attraction finds them in its object. It is because of this that the object is seen by the subject as a good which has attracted him. (LR 76)

This particular passage helps us to see that love of attraction is fundamentally passive. It should, however, be based on an experience of the whole person and not only on particular qualities: “It is something more than the state of mind of a person experiencing particular values. It has as its object a person, and its source is the whole person” (LR 76). The goodness of the object exercises an influence on the subject. This influence is attraction.

If attraction is based purely on “emotional-affective reactions” the subject can even imagine the other to “possess values which are not really present at all.” Once emotional reactions are spent, the subject, whose reaction was not based “on the truth about the other person, is left as it were in a void.” It can even happen that his emotional love is substituted by emotional hatred: “A purely emotional love often becomes an equally emotional hatred for the same person.” For this reason, with respect to attraction, our author states “that the truth about the person
who is its object must play a part at least as important as the truth of the sentiments” (LR 78).

These considerations lead Karol Wojtyla back to what we could call integral attraction:

When we speak of truth in an attraction (and by implication of truth in love) it is essential to stress that the attraction must never be limited to partial values, to something which is inherent in the person but is not the person as a whole. There must be a direct attraction to the person: in other words, response to particular qualities inherent in a person must go with a simultaneous response to the qualities of the person as such, an awareness that a person as such is a value, and not merely attractive because of certain qualities which he or she possesses. (LR 79)

In the last paragraph of this section he states: “It is therefore necessary to discover and to be attracted by the inner as well as the outer beauty, and perhaps indeed to be more attracted by the former than by the latter” (LR 80). The subject, therefore, should allow himself to be attracted by the integral goodness of the other person. In other words, it is the integral goodness of the other that ought to exercise an influence over the subject. The goodness of the other is active; the subject is basically passive – he freely allows himself to be attracted.

In synthesis we can say: the object acts, so that the subject is attracted and is led to desire. In more personal terms, John could say to Mary: because you attract me, I desire you as a good for me. Mary was first to act. Her personal beauty acted on John. He freely allowed himself to be attracted and now he desires to “have” Mary as a good for himself.

b) Love as Desire

1) Exposition of Love as Desire

Having explained love as attraction Wojtyla goes on to explain love as desire (LR 80-82). One of the first things to strike the reader of this section, which comprises a little more than two pages, is how often terms such as “need,” “lack,” and “longing” come up.43

The human person “needs other beings” and he “needs God” (LR 80). However, more pertinent to our theme, Wojtyla states that sex is “a limi-

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43 In this short section these three expressions are used fourteen times. This helps us to see how essential “need” is to Wojtyla’s love as desire.
tation, an imbalance,” and he goes on to say: “A man therefore needs a woman, so to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same way.” We have a real need which is the basis of love as desire:

This objective, ontological need makes itself felt through the sexual urge. The love of one person for another, of ‘x’ for ‘y’, grows up on the basis of that urge. This is ‘love as desire’, for it originates in a need and aims at finding a good which it lacks. (LR 81)

Our author then goes on to distinguish between love as desire and desire. Simple or mere desire can be seen in the man who looks at a woman lustfully: “This is precisely what Christ had in mind when He said (Matthew 5:28): ‘Whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart’” (LR 81). He insists: “Love as desire cannot then be reduced to desire itself.” Desire must be integrated into love as desire:

In the mind of the subject love-as-desire is not felt as mere desire. It is felt as a longing for some good for its own sake: ‘I want you because you are a good for me’. . . . And love is therefore apprehended as a longing for the person, and not as mere sensual desire, concupiscientia. Desire goes together with this longing, but it is so to speak overshadowed by it. The subject in love ... will see to it that desire does not dominate, does not overwhelm all else that love comprises. (LR 81-82)

Love as desire is called on to infuse desire with its own essence. In this way “true ‘love as desire’ never becomes utilitarian in its attitude” (LR 82). In other words, if and when the man desires the woman as a person as a good for himself, it is morally legitimate to desire sexual pleasure from his contact with this woman.

This last affirmation must of course be understood within the context of what Wojtyla will say about justifying the gift of self to one’s spouse in marriage in the eyes of the Creator. Such a justification, of course, happens through the institution of marriage (cf. LR 224).

2) A Critique

In explaining love as desire Wojtyla wrote: “A man therefore needs a woman, so to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same way. This objective, ontological need makes itself felt through the sexual urge” (LR 81). In saying that man “needs a woman, so to say, to complete his own being,” and in talking of an “ontological need,” our author seems to use a rhetorical language that could lead to misunders-
tanding. It could lead to affirming that man’s and woman’s very being is somehow deficient. The same impression could be given by describing this love as “a longing for the person” (LR 81).

Man does not, in fact, long to literally “possess” a woman. Rather, he desires the presence of the woman as “a helper fit for him” (Gn 2:20). It seems that love as desire would be best explained as a longing for mutuum adiutorium. Man needs the help (the beneficent love of woman), and she needs his help, in order to reach perfect personal fulfillment.

3) Love as Desire: love or hope?

Continuing with the theme of love as desire our author states: “Amor concupiscentiae is present even in man’s love of God, whom man may and does desire as a good for himself” (LR 82). Earlier on in the same section he had stated that “desire is of the essence of love” (LR 80).

These affirmations seem to suggest that Wojtyla’s love as desire is, in fact, very close to St. Thomas’ virtue of hope. We will now look briefly to the Summa Theologiae in order to clarify this point. Once clarified, we will see more clearly that love as goodwill, which will be analysed in our next section, cannot be simply altruistic, but must also refer to oneself.

When answering the question, Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope, St. Thomas states: “For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence.”44 When explaining why hope is a theological virtue he says: “Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue.”45 When distinguishing the object of hope from that of the other theological virtues he writes:

Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake, secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.

On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while

44 S.Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2, c.
45 S.Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 5, c.
hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect
goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for
obtaining happiness.\textsuperscript{46}

Hope, as a virtue, resides in the will\textsuperscript{47} whose object is always the good.
The above passages from St. Thomas show us that God Himself is the
good desired by this virtue. This good is of course future, arduous, but
possible with the help of God’s grace. The last passage makes it particu-
larly clear that we hope for God as a good for ourselves: “Hope makes
us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness.”
Wojtyla says that through love as desire “man may and does desire [God]
as a good for himself” (LR 82). From these considerations it seems clear
that Wojtyla’s love as desire, when it has God as its object, is equivalent
to St. Thomas’ hope.

However, we could ask, what if man desires another human person
as a good for himself? This after all is the precise case that Wojtyla is
dealing with. From St. Thomas’ doctrine on hope, it is clear that a man’s
desire to marry can in fact be an expression of the theological virtue of
hope, which also possesses secondary objects:

\begin{quote}
We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to
eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other
things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to
eternal happiness.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

Man can therefore desire to marry as a means or way to eternal happi-
ness. In this sense he can say to a woman, “I want you because you are
a good for me” (LR 81), within the context of the theological virtue of
hope. In other words, this man could say: I long to marry you, to enter into
a contract of love with you, as in this way I am guaranteed that form of
mutuum adiutorium which will be so helpful on my road to salvation.

As Love and Responsibility is principally a philosophical work, we
must also look at the possibility of a man desiring a woman or of a woman
desiring a man outside the context of the supernatural life. Such a desire
seems to be an expression of the virtue of magnanimity:

Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining some-
thing that is within one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the doing

\textsuperscript{46} S.Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 6, c.
\textsuperscript{47} Cf. S.Th. II-II, q. 18, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{48} S.Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 2, ad. 2.
of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another’s help.\textsuperscript{49}

The object of hope is an arduous good obtained with the help of God’s grace; the object of magnanimity is an arduous good, which is within the natural powers of man. Marriage could certainly be such a good. Marriage, understood as an “intimate community of life and love,”\textsuperscript{50} could not possibly be the object of the passion of desire or concupiscentia. It must therefore be an object of the irascible passion of hope “which tends to a difficult good.”\textsuperscript{51} The virtue of “magnanimity is immediately about the passion of hope,”\textsuperscript{52} and “a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act.”\textsuperscript{53} Magnanimity could certainly have marriage as its object. Through this virtue a man could certainly say of a woman: “I want you because you are a good for me” (\textit{LR} 81).

Once again we note that Wojtyła’s love of desire always presupposes a “need,” “lack,” or “longing.” In the short section dedicated to love as desire (\textit{LR} 80-82) these three expressions are used fourteen times. We now quote two of these passages: “This is ‘love as desire’, for it originates in a need and aims at finding a good which it lacks” (\textit{LR} 81); “For love as desire implies – as we have said – a real need” (\textit{LR} 82). This helps us to see how essential “need” is to Wojtyła’s love as desire. Its object is, therefore, the \textit{absent} good, and not the good \textit{simpliciter}. It is for this reason that Wojtyła’s love as desire seems, in fact, to be St. Thomas’ hope or magnanimity.

It is interesting to note that in his dialogue with André Frossard, published under the title \textit{Be Not Afraid!}, Pope John Paul II will make a connection between marriage and magnanimity:

Marriage – like the priesthood – requires a humble magnanimity and a mutual confidence which implies a source deeper than purely human feelings.

The sacrament by which man and woman, who are in fact its dispensers, swear ‘love, honour and fidelity’ to each other until death, tends towards the humble magnanimity on which the true dignity and vocation of spouses

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{S.Th.} II-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad. 4.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Catechism of the Catholic Church} (= \textit{CCC}), Dublin 1994, n. 1603.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{S.Th.} II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad. 2.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{S.Th.} II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad. 2.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{S.Th.} II-II, q. 129, a. 1, c.
Here we see that marriage requires and tends towards magnanimity. While these words of Pope John Paul II allow us to affirm that the act by which men and women desire to enter marriage is indeed magnanimous, it does not seem legitimate to conclude that our author wants to give the name of magnanimity to what he called love as desire in Love and Responsibility.

However, it is possible to affirm that desire – understood as a balanced tendency towards sexual pleasure in marriage – can be integrated into magnanimity – understood here as the desire to live an “intimate community of life and love” with a member of the opposite sex.

c) Love as Goodwill

1) Explaining Love as Goodwill

We now move on to study love as goodwill, which, according to Wojtyla, is the highest form of human love and is, therefore, that which helps us most to understand divine love. This love is compared to love as desire in the following terms:

For love as desire is not the whole essence of love between persons. It is not enough to long for a person as a good for oneself, one must also, and above all, long for that person’s good. This uncompromisingly altruistic orientation of the will and feelings is called in the language of St. Thomas amor benevolentiae or benevolentia for short. (LR 83)

Here amor benevolentiae is described as being an “uncompromisingly altruistic orientation of the will.” While one desires the good for oneself – even to the extent of desiring another person as a good – one must “above all” long for the good of the other. There seems to be little doubt but that love as goodwill is altruistic for Karol Wojtyla. Within the same section he describes this form of love as follows:

Goodwill is quite free of self-interest, the traces of which are conspicuous in love as desire. Goodwill is the same as selflessness in love: not ‘I long for you as a good’ but ‘I long for your good’, ‘I long for that which is good for you’. The person of goodwill longs for this with no selfish ulterior motive, no personal consideration. Love as goodwill, amor benevolentiae, is therefore love in a more unconditional sense than love-desire. It is the...

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54 A. FROSSARD - JOHN PAUL II, Be Not Afraid!, New York 1984, 120.
purest form of love. Goodwill brings us as close to the ‘pure essence’ of love as it is possible to get. (LR 83-84)

Love as goodwill is portrayed in terms that seem to be radically altruistic. It is “quite free of self-interest.” It seems very clear that the human person does not have amor benevolentiae for him or herself. As it is of great importance to have as certain an interpretation as is possible on this point, we will now turn to secondary authors to confirm our interpretation.

Buttiglione says that the “specific feature of the ‘love as goodwill’ is that one seeks first the true good of the other.”

Brazilian author, Paulo Cesar da Silva, introduces love as goodwill with the heading: “Love as willing the good for the other.”

American author Vincent M. Walsh talks of amor benevolentiae or benevolentia as “an uncompromising altruistic love.” Love of goodwill, therefore, has as its object the good of the other.

Walter Schu in his very comprehensive work on The Splendor of Love: Pope John Paul’s Vision for Marriage and Family gives us an altruistic definition of love and even has the support of a poor translation of the Summa Theologiae that found its way into the English Version of the Catechism of the Catholic Church: “To love is to will the good of another.” The Summa actually states “amare est velle alicui bonum.” It then goes on to explicitly include love of self: “Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii: et in illud cui vult bonum.”

Needless to say the editio typica of the Universal Catechism gives the correct and more inclusive definition of love: “Amare est velle

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59 S.Th. I-II, q. 26, a. 4, c.: “to love is to wish good to someone. Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone, - to himself or to another, and towards that to which he wishes some good.”

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and refers us to Summa as quoted above. Simply speaking love of goodwill must include love of self.

A close reading of Wojtyla’s section on Love as Goodwill reveals not only the good of the other as the object of this love, but it also seems to indicate that the object of this love is the good that the other does not yet possess. In other words, the object of goodwill is the absent good of the other. This is seen in the use of expressions such as: “One must … long for that person’s good”; “I long for your good”; “I long for that which is good for you”; “The person of goodwill longs for this with no selfish motive.” In all these cases the Polish verb “pragnąć”61 is used. This verb indicates one’s desiring a good that one does not yet possess. It clearly implies the absence of the good. This gives the impression that the absent or future good of the other is the object of love as goodwill.

2) Love as the Affirmation of the Value of the Person

Chapter 2 of Love and Responsibility is dedicated to The Person and Love. We will now move from the first to the third section of this chapter, which is entitled The Ethical Analysis of Love. The subsection that interests us here is called Affirmation of the Value of the Person (LR 11-15). This will help us to complete our vision of love and, we believe, will show that the object of love of goodwill can also be the good that the other person already possesses.

Before dealing specifically with this theme, our author had already spoken of “the assertion of the value of the human person” (LR 31). He had also stated: “We have to do ... with the value of the person, which is for all humanity the most precious of goods – more immediate and greater than any economic good” (LR 65). Later he talks of being aware “that a person as such is a value” (LR 79). It is clear that Wojtyla wants his readers to see that the simple intrinsic goodness of a person must be understood and appreciated.

Looking now to the section that deals specifically with our theme, we first see in what the value of the person consists:

To the structure of the person belongs an ‘interior’, in which we find the elements of spiritual life, and it is this that compels us to acknowledge the spiritual nature of the human soul, and the peculiar perfectibility of the

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60 Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae (= CCE), Vatican City 1997, n. 1766. p. 471.

61 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Miłość i odpowiedzialność, Lublin 2001, 77.78.
human person. This determines the value of the person. (LR 121)

The value of the person consists in his “spiritual nature” and in his “peculiar perfectibility” as a human person. This being so, Wojtyla insists: “Every person of the opposite sex possesses value in the first place as a person, and only secondarily possesses a sexual value” (LR 122).

He then goes on to talk of the relationship between love and the affirmation of the person. He describes “the fundamental ethical characteristic of love” in the following terms:

It is an affirmation of the person or else it is not love at all. If it is informed with a proper attitude to the value of the person – this attitude we have called here ‘affirmation’ – it is love in all its fullness, ‘integral’ love. (LR 123)

Here we see that love affirms the intrinsic goodness or value of the person. We could now ask ourselves, is this act of affirmation an act of the intellect or of the will? If it is an act of love it is quite obviously an act of the will, which presupposes the act by which the intellect first recognized the intrinsic goodness of the person.

It should also be noted that the subject does not will that the object receive a new good. It is an act that does not refer to a future good, but to a good which the person already possesses. The subject wills the other person to have that good which he already possesses. This, for Wojtyla, is “the fundamental ethical characteristic of love.” In fact, it could not be otherwise. How could we want the perfection of the human person, if we do not truly will that he or she be a person? Love presupposes that we want the person to be a person. Love, therefore, has as its object, not only the absent good of the other, but also the good which he already possesses, namely, his personhood.

This seems to us to be of greatest importance in the entire vision of Pope Wojtyla. If we really want the other to be a person, we will want him or her to develop as such, to reach personal perfection. The antithesis is obvious: when we “reduce” the person to being an object of sexual pleasure, we will implicitly desire that that person will not reach a truly personal perfection. We could even reach the stage of willing that the person stops being a human person, if his or her “personhood” were an obstacle to our sexual pleasure. In other words, once the other becomes an object of sexual pleasure, we would not be saddened by his or her loss of the capacity to reason and to will, as long as he or she could continue providing pleasure. Repeating, we say, if we do not will the other to be a person, we will not will personal perfection for him or her. This shows
that, for Wojtyla, the object of love is not only the absent good, but also the good that the person already possesses.

It would seem to us that what our author calls the affirmation of the value of the person corresponds to St. Thomas’ joy, as an act of charity:

For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend, though he be absent.62

**Affirming the value of the person** is an act by which the will “rejoices in the well-being of his friend.” It rejoices in the most basic “well-being” of all, namely, that the friend is a human person. In other words, one recognizes and rejoices “because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it.” One rejoices because personhood exists in the other person. One wants him or her to be a person and no less than a person. Once this act of joy is present, one can then go on to see that the other “person possesses spiritual perfectibility” (LR 121) and one can will that he or she attain personal and spiritual perfection.

The particular section now under study seems to confirm that, for Wojtyla, the object of love as goodwill is the good of the other. When talking about love as a virtue he says:

This virtue is produced in the will and has at its disposal the resources of the will’s spiritual potential: in other words, it is an authentic commitment of the free will of one person (the subject), resulting from the truth about another person (the object). (LR 123)

That the subject of love is the will is very clear. However, it seems to be equally clear, from this English translation, that the object of the virtue of love is always another person. Love results “from the truth about another person (the object).” The Polish reads “czyli stanowi autentyczne zaangażowanie wolności osoby-podmiotu płynące z prawdy o osobie-przedmiocie.”63 A literal translation of the last words, which are most important for our considerations, would be “person-object” and not “another person (the object).” The English translation is, therefore, an interpretative and not a literal translation. However, it seems to convey very well the meaning of the Polish, which implies that the “person-object” is necessarily distinct from the “person-subject.” This confirms

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62 *S. Th.* II-II, q. 28, a. 1, c.
our interpretation of *Love and Responsibility*, namely, that the object of love-of-goodwill is *the good of another person*.

This, as we will see, does not seem to reflect the fullness of the truth about *love as goodwill*. We have already alluded to this above. We will give it greater attention in Section 5 of this article.

### 3) The Pastoral Efficacy of Wojtyla’s Approach

Despite our criticism we can see that there is a profound pastoral or pedagogical value in the way Wojtyla explains love as being free of self-interest and as having the good of the other as its object. As a result of original sin the soul of man has suffered four wounds. These are summarised by St. Thomas in the following manner:

Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order to the good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable as moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.64

As a result of these wounds the human person: is inclined to have little interest in truth as a good in itself; is inclined to have a tendency towards injustice (especially when it comes to material possessions); is inclined to shun the arduous good (especially if it is spiritual); and, more especially, is inclined to an excessive desire towards sensual goods.

The human person is inclined towards those kinds of goods whose acquisition necessarily involves competition with others – material possessions, power and sensual pleasure being the obvious examples. St. John exhorted us against love of such goods:

> Do not love the world or the things in the world. If any one loves the world, love for the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world. (1 Jn 2, 15-16)

It is of great importance to note that all such goods necessarily involve competition with others. However, it is also of great importance to note that all such goods are, in God’s plan, at the service of the greatest goods, namely virtue and virtuous action. When it comes to possessing these, the greatest goods, there is no question of competition with others. In

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64 *S.Th. I-II, q. 85, a. 3, c.*
fact, the virtue of the other can only help me to grow in virtue and his virtuous acts can only facilitate my performing of similar acts. Even if my neighbour performs an act of virtue that I had intended to perform (for example, by alleviating the poverty of a certain person), I can rejoice in his virtuous act and thereby, not only gain the merit that I would have gained if I had performed that act, but also gain the merit of rejoicing in my neighbour’s act. Here we see true self-interest can never be in opposition to love of neighbour.

Wojtyla’s approach can therefore be understood as aimed at overcoming false love of self, a self-love aimed at apparent goods. It is for this reason that the altruistic accent of Wojtyla’s explanation can help us to overcome the effects of original sin. However, simply speaking, we must insist that man ought to have goodwill towards himself.

It should also be noted that Wojtyla speaks of self-fulfilment as a consequence of this “purest form of love”: “Such love does more than any other to perfect the person who experiences it, brings both the subject and the object of that love the greatest fulfilment” (LR 83-84). So, in fact, the person who practises this form of love does love himself. He acts in a way that will bring about his own fulfilment. However, it seems that, in the view of our author, this fulfilment is not directly willed by love as goodwill. Rather it comes about by not being directly willed.

Once again this brings us back to the pedagogical value of Wojtyla’s approach: it is by “forgetting ourselves,” for love of others, that we overcome the consequences of original sin and come to true happiness. This seems to echo the attitude of St. Paul who exhorted the Romans: “Love one another with brotherly affection; outdo one another in showing honour” (Rm 12:10). If we are to overcome our weaknesses, we do in practice need to concern ourselves more with our neighbour than with ourselves.

It should also be said that benevolent love can be described as disinterested because the true Christian wants to contribute to the goodness of the beloved for his or her own sake. He would, in fact, be prepared to contribute to the good of the other even if there were no profit or advantage in it for himself. This, of course, is not possible, as by willing the good for another, I am necessarily willing virtuous action for myself: This point will become clearer in our study of Wojtyla’s The Acting Person. In this work, our author will show how the agent is the most immediate beneficiary of his or her own action.
4) Disinterestedness in the Context of Chastity

Wojtyla’s Thought

In Chapter 3 of *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyla returns to the theme of “disinterestedness” in his section on *Tenderness and Sensuality*. He affirms that tenderness “is not an expression of concupiscence but of benevolence and devotion” (*LR* 202-203).

In comparing “sensuality and the will to sexual enjoyment” with tenderness, he writes: “Unlike these, tenderness may be entirely disinterested – when it exhibits above all concern for the other person and his inner situation. This disinterestedness diminishes as and when manifestations of tenderness serve primarily the need to gratify one’s own feelings” (*LR* 203). On the one hand, he talks of tenderness being “entirely disinterested”; he then talks of a diminishing of this disinterestedness if tenderness “serve[s] primarily the need to gratify one’s own feelings”; he immediately goes on to recognize that gratifying one’s own feelings “may have its value, in that it brings with it a feeling of closeness in relation to another human being” (*LR* 203). He ends this particular paragraph by saying: “A certain ‘self-interest’ enters into human love, without in any way detracting from its proper character – as our metaphysical analysis has shown. Every human being is a limited good, and for that reason capable of disinterestedness only within limits” (*LR* 203). Within the context of his discussion on tenderness he speaks of it being “entirely disinterested.” On the other hand, he accepts that a “certain ‘self-interest’ enters into human love, without in any way detracting from its proper character.” We are “capable of disinterestedness only within limits.”

In his metaphysical analysis he explained true interest in one’s own good, “I want you because you are a good for me” (*LR* 81), within the context of *love as desire* and not within the context of the more elevated *love as goodwill*. It is for this reason that *disinterestedness*, intimately associated with *love as goodwill*, is above (more elevated than) genuine *self-interest*, which is connected with *love as desire*. Benevolence, in Wojtyla’s view, is therefore altruistic.

Commentary from Lublin

The Lublin Commentators, in an important footnote, commented on the particular section of *Love and Responsibility* that we are now studying:

An act of love, as an act of affirmation of the person to whom it is directed, is in respect for that person’s dignity of its very nature a disinterested act.
It possesses, in addition to its short-term consequences (it is an act of beneficence) some enduring consequences. It is a unique form of ‘good deed’ for the subject of action, who in performing an act of love fulfils himself or herself most fully. Love is at once ‘disinterested and rewarded’.

As this footnote seems, in our modest opinion, to offer the “DNA” of Wojtyla’s idea of disinterested love, we will now analyse this passage.

The very first sentence affirms that when I love another by affirming his person, and when this affirmation is based on his dignity, my act is essentially disinterested.

The second sentence introduces us to the transitive and intransitive effects of the love of the subject:

- The transitive effects, i.e. the “short-term consequences,” are explained in terms of beneficence, obviously in favour of the second person. The subject does a good-deed for this second person.
- The intransitive effects, i.e. the “enduring consequences,” are explained in terms of beneficence sui generis toward the person who acts – “a unique form of ‘good deed’ for the subject of action.” The person realizes himself by loving another.

The subject does not and cannot give realisation to the second person. He can only help him, through beneficence, so that he, the second person, will find it easier to realize himself. In doing so, the first person actually realizes himself in a most immediate way, whereas, his contribution to the realisation of the second person is rather indirect. He is beneficent, so that the second person will have greater facility in performing acts of love and, thereby, in realising himself.

The conclusion that we take from these considerations is that, the greatest good that we do is always to ourselves and never to our neighbour. In fact, even if our neighbour rejected our help, we would still have done a great good to ourselves. We would, in fact, have imitated God, who “makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust” (Mt 5:45). This seems to point us towards affirming that love as goodwill has the subject as its primary object. By using Wojtyla’s own line of argument and by availing of the Lublin com-

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65 Footnote 55 to Love and Responsibility, 305. This footnote refers us to the article Il problema del costituirsi della cultura attraverso la Praxis umana, in: Revista di filosofia neoscolastica 69 (1977) 513-514.
mentators, we seem forced to say that *love as goodwill* cannot, *simply speaking*, be altruistic.

The very last sentence of the above quoted passage affirms: “Love is at once ‘disinterested and rewarded.’” This particular sentence is not contained in the Italian\(^{66}\) or in the Polish\(^{67}\) footnote. However it seems to convey the idea that *love as goodwill* does not want the reward, but receives it. The reward is not to be a conscious end of action; rather it is accepted as a consequence of good action. This is precisely where we see the problem with our author. If God desires, out of love for us, that we receive the reward of our actions, and if we have received God’s love into our hearts through the Holy Spirit (cf. *Rm* 5:5), it seems that we should not only accept the reward, but we should also want it out of true self-love of goodwill.

4. Love and Disinterestedness in Later Writings

a) A Implicit Affirmation of Love of Self in *The Acting Person*

It seems to us that a close analysis of *The Acting Person* reveals that *love of self* is a more basic expression of *love as goodwill* than is *love for another person*. In this work, considered by many as the philosophical masterpiece of our author, he seems to implicitly show that *love of goodwill* has the loving subject as its primary object.

When explaining self-determination he states: “Because of self-determination every man actually governs himself; he actually exercises that specific power over himself which nobody else can exercise or execute” (*AP* 107). Man has, therefore, a power over himself that nobody else has. He possesses a way of determining himself that nobody else possesses. The corollary is obvious: he exercises an influence over himself that he does not and cannot exercise over others.


\(^{67}\) Cf. footnote 61, K. WOJTYŁA, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność*, 181.
In the next subsection he states: “In action, through self-determination, the person is for himself an object, in a certain manner the first object, or rather, the nearest object.” He then goes on to say:

Objectification means that in every actual act of self-determination – in every “I will” – the self is the object, indeed the primary and the nearest object. This is contained in the concept itself, and the term expressing it – “self-determination” – means that one is determined by oneself. (AP 108-109)

Here we see very clearly that, in the view of Wojtyla, acts of willing have as their primary and nearest object the acting subject. We could add that, if this willing is a good willing one must necessarily be willing good for oneself as “the primary and nearest object.” Only afterwards can one will good for another. Love as goodwill must, therefore, have the acting subject as its primary object. Love as goodwill cannot, therefore, be radically altruistic.

Wojtyla also explains the difference between willing as an intentional act and the experience “I will” in its full content:

Willing as an intentional act, that is to say, an experience directed toward its proper object, which may be defined both as an end and as a value, differs from the experience of “I will” in its full content. For the experience of “I will” contains also self-determination and not only intentionality. The turning to any external object that is seen as an end or a value implies a simultaneous fundamental turn toward the ego as the object. (AP 110)

Intentionality refers to the “external object” that we turn to “as an end or a value.” However, this turning to the “external object” also “implies a simultaneous fundamental turn” towards oneself. It implies a willing that has oneself as object.

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68 K. Wojtyla, *Persona e atto*, in: *Metafisica della persona*, Milano 2003, 969: “nel’atto, mediante l’autodeterminazione, la persona è per se stessa oggetto, in un certo modo oggetto primo, ovvero il più vicino.” English translation mine. At this particular point there is a diversion between the Italian edition, based on the third and definitive edition of the Polish (Lublin 1994), and the English, published in 1979. There is not an essential difference between the content of these two passages. We quote the English edition for the sake of completeness: Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (*Analecta Husserliana* 10) (= AP), Dordrecht 1979, 108: “the person is, owing to self-determination, an object for himself, in a peculiar way being the immanent target upon which man’s exercise of all his powers concentrates, insofar as it is he whose determination is at stake. He is in this sense, the primary object or the nearest object of his action.”
If we now look back to *Love and Responsibility* we will see that this external object can be another person: “In any association between a man and a woman, and in the sexual relationship itself the object of activity is of course always another person” (*LR* 32). The other person is then “an end or a value” outside the acting person. But in “every ‘I will’ – the self is the object, indeed the primary and the nearest object” (*AP* 108-109). This allows us to conclude that in such a man-woman relationship, the “I will” of the subject, has as its principal object the good of that subject and not the good of the other person.

Our interpretation of Wojtyla seems to receive confirmation from the following passage:

Self-determination does not mean merely proceeding from the ego, as the source and the initial point of willing and choice; it means also the specific returning to that same ego which is its primary and basic object and with regard to which all intentional objects – everything and anything one wills or wants – are in some way more remote, transitory and just as external. (*AP* 109)

One’s own ego is the primary and basic object of its own willing. All intentional objects, “everything or anything one wills or wants” are more remote than one’s own ego. In *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyla accepted that one can legitimately will another person as a good for oneself: “Love as desire ... is felt as a longing for some good for its own sake: ‘I want you because you are a good for me’” (*LR* 81). If our willing has self-determination as it primary object, and if intentional objects are necessarily more remote, it would seem to follow that *simpliciter* the willing of the good is first referred to ourselves and only remotely to others. *Love as goodwill* cannot, therefore, be radically altruistic.

We may further add that *love as desire* cannot be logically prior to *love as goodwill*. *Love as goodwill* has as its object the good *simpliciter*. *Love as desire* has as its object the good *qua* absent.

At this point we would like to offer another line of argumentation to corroborate our above conclusion. To love is to will the good for someone. Now the greatest goods that we can will for a person in this life are virtue and virtuous action. If the *good that we will is virtuous action* it is obvious that we can only directly will it for ourselves. My virtuous act depends immediately on my own will and not on the will of someone else. I cannot will such an act directly for another. I can will that the other
would will, but I cannot substitute his act of willing. Simply speaking, I can only will virtuous action immediately for myself.

Within the context of my own virtuous action, I can, of course, will a particular good act for myself, namely, the act of helping my neighbour to perform a virtuous act. But it is he or she who must will to actually perform that act. I cannot immediately will good action for my neighbour. In other words, I cannot substitute the act by which he performs the virtuous act.

Now, as virtue grows through virtuous action, I can will to help my neighbour grow in virtue by helping him to perform virtuous actions. However, as we have stated above, I cannot substitute the act which actually brings about growth in virtue. The acts by which a person grows in virtue must be immediately willed by him or herself. This helps us to see that love of goodwill has the acting subject as its most immediate object.

b) Love of Self in The Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis

The article that we now turn our attention to was first presented as a paper in 1977 at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. Wojtyla gives us his own understanding of how St. Thomas understood human action:

As I understand St. Thomas’ thought, human activity (action) is simultaneously transitive and intransitive. It is transitive insofar as it tends beyond the subject, seeks an expression and effect in the external world, and is objectified in some product. It is intransitive, on the other hand, insofar as it remains in the subject, determines the subject’s immanent quality or value, and constitutes the subject’s essentially human fieri. In acting, we not only perform actions, but we also become ourselves through those actions – we fulfill ourselves in them.69

Our principal scope in this series of articles is to understand and evaluate the thought of Pope Wojtyla and not, whether or not, his interpretation of St. Thomas is correct. However, it seems necessary to comment on this particular understanding of Aquinas. In Wojtyla’s own footnote to this section he gives six references to the Summa Theologiae.70 However,

70 For the sake of completeness we will quote this footnote in its entirety: Footnote 5 (cf. Person and Community, 266) on p. 273 of the article Constitution of Culture, in: Person and Community: “See, for example, Summa theologiae I, 23, 2 ad 1; I, 56, 1; I, 18,
none of these makes the distinction that Wojtyla is actually making. St. Thomas talks of two different kinds of action: firstly, “Actions [which] passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion – for example, the actions of warming and cutting”; secondly, “Actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing.”

St. Thomas is therefore talking of two different kinds of acts, acts which have direct objects and acts which do not have direct objects. Wojtyla, basing himself of these parts of the *Summa*, basically says that all acts have a double dimension: the transitive and the intransitive. Five of the six places that Wojtyla refers to reveal this difficulty. The sixth reference of Wojtyla (*S.Th. I-II, q.1, a.6, ad 1*) simply does not refer to this theme.

After this digression we will now try to analyse the thought of Wojtyla. He says that “human activity is simultaneously transitive and intransitive” and explains by saying:

- It is transitive in that “it tends beyond the subject, seeks an expression and effect in the external world, and is objectified in some product.”

- It is intransitive in that “it remains in the subject, determines the subject’s immanent quality or value, and constitutes the subject’s essentially human *fieri*.”

It should be further noted from a close reading of *The Acting Person* that, for Wojtyla, every act seems to have this double dimension:

- For every action contains within itself an intentional orientation; each action is directed towards definite objects or sets of objects, and is aimed outward and beyond itself. On the other hand, because of self-determination, an action reaches and penetrates into the subject, into the ego, which is its primary and principal object. Parallel with this there comes the transitivity and intransitiveness of the human action. (*AP* 150)

This double dimension, therefore, seems to be a feature of all human acts for Wojtyla. Every act possesses an intentional orientation and is self-determining. Speaking of this second dimension, Buttiglione says: “For Wojtyla, however, the act always has an immediate effect in the man

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3 ad 1; I, 85, 2; I-II, 31, 5; and I-II, 1, 6 ad 1.” Cf. footnote 5 to Il problema del constituìrsi della cultura attraverso la «praxis» umana, in: *Metafisica della persona*, 1449.

71 *S.Th. I, q. 23, a. 2, ad. 1.*
who carries it out, and it is through this that human truth is realized or negated.”72 This, in fact, is the most important effect of any act.

The “priority in the praxiological sense”73 is to be found in the intransitive dimension:

This superiority is synonymous with regarding the intransitive in human activity as more important that the transitive. In other words, that which conditions the value of human beings and comprises the essentially human quality of their activity is more important than that which is objectified in some product or other and serves to “transform the world” or merely exploit it.74

We must now face a particular hermeneutical difficulty: it is very evident from the above quoted passages that the intransitive effect refers to the effect that the action has over the subject who acts, in the sense of transforming him or her into a good or bad person. However, there also exists the transitive effect, i.e. “that which is objectified in some product or other.”

We must now ask: what if the object of action is another person? The mother who educates her child or the husband who loves his wife through the conjugal act? In these acts there is no “product” in the literal sense of the world, so we cannot, without qualification, affirm that the act “is transitive insofar as it tends beyond the subject, seeks an expression and effect in the external world, and is objectified in some product.”75 Nor does it seem very convenient to say: “Each action is directed towards definite objects or sets of objects, and is aimed outward and beyond itself.” (AP 150)

As it is impossible to talk of the effect that we have on another person as being an intransitive effect, and as Wojtyla did not hesitate to say: “In any association between a man and a woman, and in the sexual relationship itself the object of activity is of course always another person” (LR 32), we can justifiably conclude, that when another person is the object of our act, we are, in fact, talking of a transitive effect of our action.

72 R. Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 300.
74 Ibidem, 267-268.
75 Ibidem, 266.
This transitive effect that we can exercise over another person must of course be understood within the context of Wojtyla’s personalism:

Human beings, as willed by the Creator for themselves, may not be deprived of their autoteleology; they may not be regarded as means or tools in their own praxis, but must preserve their own proper superiority in relation to it, their priority in the praxiological sense.⁷⁶

By keeping in mind two facts:

• to the extent that our acts have other persons as their objects they are really transitive;

• these same acts must respect the autoteleology of these other persons, they must respect the fact that others are called on to direct themselves freely to virtuous action and, thereby, to growth in personal goodness through their own freely chosen acts;

we see that our acts must remain before the threshold of the other’s interior life. We cannot will for them, we cannot substitute their act of willing. The most we can do is to help them to freely choose virtuous action and virtue. We cannot love them in that most immediate sense, i.e. in the sense of willing the good action for them. They must freely will it.

This brings us back to our basic conclusion: love as goodwill – willing the greatest goods for a person – must start with love for oneself. Love of goodwill cannot be radically altruistic. This conclusion seems to be forced on us by a close reading of the article now under consideration in conjunction with the other Wojtylian sources that we quoted.

c) Disinterestedness in L’uomo nel campo della responsabilità

We will now turn back to the theme of disinterestedness in our author. It seems that, with the passage of time, Wojtyla spoke more absolutely of disinterestedness with little or no positive references to interest in oneself. In 1972 he sent to Tadeusz Styczen an initial draft of what was intended to become the “ethical continuation” of.⁷⁷ This work was published in 1991 and, even though it is but an initial draft, it gives useful insights into the thought of Karol Wojtyla.

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⁷⁶ Ibidem, 267.
In the Part II of this work, in which he explains the role of norms in ethics, he writes:

The specific absoluteness of the moral value and of its disinterested character is reflected in the norm of morality. This definition of moral value and of the norm of morality causes us to look in particular at the honesty or the dignity of the person. One could maintain that in morality, and in the norm of morality, there does not exist a genuine disinterest given that man, in his acts, desires to realise his own dignity. It appears that in this case we can apply the acute analyses of Scheler, according to whom, moral value is not in itself the object of willing or of desire, but this [moral value] is realized “on the occasion” of willing distinct values, according to the qualities of these [distinct] values. But this just intuition of Scheler is referred not to moral value in itself, but to honesty or better, to the dignity of the person. Man realises this dignity through his actions – properly speaking, through those values which, in his acts, he posits as the object of his desire. In this manner the dignity of the person is in some way excluded from the sphere of interest.  

Earlier we saw that Wojtyla is inclined to suggest that eternal happiness should not be so much an end of our actions but more a consequence that we accept. We do not aim at the reward; rather we accept it.

In the above passage we see that he applies a similar principle to one’s own personal dignity. On the one hand, Scheler maintained that we do not will moral value as such, but only the distinct values present in given acts. However, we gain moral value “on the occasion” of willing these distinct values. On the other hand, Wojtyla maintains that we do not will personal dignity. Such would be against disinterestedness. However, we gain it through good actions. He confirms our interpretation by saying: “Therefore, we can affirm that the norm of morality indicates disinterestedness with regard to the dignity of the person as the end of action (autodetermination).”

Dignity, therefore, as a personal good is not directly willed. Rather it is accepted as a consequence of good action. This seems to represent another confirmation that, in the view of Wojtyla, love, at its purest form, love as goodwill, does not will the good for oneself. It other words, it should be radically altruistic.

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79 Ibidem, 1263. English translation mine.
Within Part II of the work now under consideration Karol Wojtyla dedicates a section to *Utilitarianism and Teleology*. After affirming that Kant was against all teleology in ethics, our author goes on to give his own view, but in dialogue with the German philosopher:

It is a matter of responding to the question if the norm of morality is – or can be – in anyway connected to teleology or if this connection excludes morality, as it seems that Kant suggests. In fact, in his opinion all so called hypothetical norms, all norms of the kind: “if you want to arrive at X you should do Y” do not have an ethical character and do not define a moral duty, but contain a form of utilitarianism (let us say of interest). The ethical norm should define a disinterested duty. We can and we should accept all this, but it is difficult to accept the opinion according to which disinterested duty, as duty for duty’s sake (*Pflicht aus Pflicht*), is without an objective or is a-teleological.

Wojtyla, therefore, accepts that doing Y in order to arrive at X is a form of utilitarianism. However, he does not accept that doing Y is a-teleological. The performance of the action Y can have the end X, but it is an end that should *not be aimed at* in the performing of Y. The end is, therefore, accidentally connected with the performance of the act. It is not to be considered as the motive of the act. This view of Wojtyla confirms our interpretation that *love as goodwill*, the highest form of love, cannot have one’s own good as its end. For Wojtyla *love as goodwill* is altruistic.

d) Disinterestedness in *The Family as a Community of Persons*

In 1974 our author published the article *The Family as a Community of Persons*. In it he developed the connection *communio*, *gift* and *disinterestedness*:

In the communal relationship that occurs between persons, this self-fulfillment is realized through the mutual gift of self, a gift that has a disinterested character…. At the same time, this gift has a disinterested character, which is why it fully deserves the name *gift*. If it were to serve some “interest” on one side or the other, it would no longer be a gift. It might perhaps be beneficial and even useful, but it would not be gratuitous. The whole tradition of Christian thought defends the *transutilitarian* dimension of human activity and existence. This is closely connected with the evangelical teaching on

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80 Cf. *ibidem*, 1267: “Kant dunque... si pronuncia decisamente contro ogni teleologia nell’etica”.

love and grace. Grace, in the final analysis (as well as in the primary and basic sense), is a disinterested gift of God to human beings, who both realize and manifest this transutilitarian dimension of the existence and activity proper to the world of persons. In interhuman relationships, therefore, the disinterested gift of self (of the person) stands at the basis of the whole order of love and the whole authenticity of love.

The human being as a person is capable of such a gift. Moreover, a personal gift of this nature does not impoverish but enriches the giver. Personal development takes place through the disinterested gift of self – and this development also involves the development of love in and between people. The disinterested gift of self initiates a relationship, in some way creates a relationship, by the mere fact of being directed toward another person or persons.82

Unlike that which Wojtyla wrote in 1957, this passage seems to leave little room for what we call true self-interest. In fact, he states: “If it were to serve some ‘interest’ on one side or the other, it would no longer be a gift.” However, he also states: “A personal gift of this nature does not impoverish but enriches the giver.” We could conclude, therefore, that such a gift-of-self is in one’s own best interests. It brings about personal development. However, for Wojtyla this personal enrichment must come about as a consequence of self-giving. In other words, I should not give myself in order to be enriched as a person, but should simply accept the personal enrichment that comes about through self-giving. The self-fulfillment involved in self-giving is not willed, but accepted.

e) Disinterestedness in The Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis

We will now turn back to the paper that Card. Karol Wojtyla presented on The Constitution of Culture Through Human Praxis at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan in 1977. He presents the theme of disinterestedness in the context of wonder and contemplatio:

It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond all the confines of the various kinds of utilitarianism and discover within the full richness of human praxis its deep relation to truth, goodness, and beauty, a relation that has a disinterested – pure and nonutilitarian – character. This disinterestedness of the relation essentially conditions the enticement of which Norwid writes: enticement, wonder, contemplatio, forms the essential basis of the consti-

tution of culture through human praxis.\textsuperscript{83}

Here he describes man’s relationship to truth, goodness and beauty as disinterested. Such disinterestedness conditions wonder and contemplation. It is obvious that for Wojtyla such a wonder is not “useful.” In other words, we could say, it is not productive. Precisely that which is “not useful” gives sense to all that is “useful.” All the products of our work “can be said to be a result of the particular intensity of that which is intransitive and remains within our disinterested communion with truth, goodness, and beauty.”\textsuperscript{84}

This particular meditation on “disinterestedness” seems to have the finality of showing how philosophical or even theological wonder is at the basis of all cultural enterprises. It would, therefore, not seem just to interpret this particular passage as being in any way opposed to true self-love.

\section{5. An Evaluation of Love and Disinterestedness in Wojtyla}

Very early in his academic career, especially in his thesis on Max Scheler,\textsuperscript{85} Wojtyla shows that it is morally acceptable to perform good actions in order to obtain our eternal reward. In the \textit{Lublin Lectures} he explains Aristotle’s doctrine on love of self and seems to accept it in an uncritical way.\textsuperscript{86} In his early writings, therefore, he accepts what seems to be love as goodwill towards oneself and also, what we could call, true self-interest based on this love as goodwill.

However, in \textit{Love and Responsibility} his love of self will be explained as love of desire which is not as elevated as love of goodwill. We have seen that, for Karol Wojtyla, love of goodwill, which is the purest form of love and, therefore, most like unto God’s own love, is disinterested. This is the explicit teaching of our author. Love, therefore, we concluded, does not seek a reward; it accepts it.

However, we believe that a close reading of the works of our author, especially what he says about self-determination and the intransitive effects of human action reveal that we do, in fact, love ourselves with a love as goodwill, and this is necessarily prior to loving our neighbour.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{83} K. \textsc{Wojtyla}, \textit{Constitution of Culture}, in: \textit{Person and Community}, 270-271.
\item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibidem}, 271.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Cf. K. \textsc{Wojtyla}, \textit{Valutazioni su Max Scheler}, in: \textit{Metafisica della persona}, 418.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Cf. K. \textsc{Wojtyla}, \textit{Das Gute und der Wert}, in: \textit{Lubliner Vorlesungen}, 138.144.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
We will now go on to present arguments in favour of the position that states that love as goodwill cannot be radically altruistic, and simply speaking, it cannot be disinterested.

a) The Nature of Charity

We will first look to the words of St. Paul: “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Rm 5:5). These words refer, of course, to the virtue of charity, by which the human person loves in a truly divine manner. In God all is one. His love is therefore one. When we receive this love in baptism we receive the one love by which God loves Himself, ourselves and others.

As love as goodwill “brings us as close to the ‘pure essence’ of love as it is possible to get” (LR 84), God’s own love, poured into our hearts, is best described as love as goodwill. And, as this love is one, it is necessary that we love God, ourselves and others with this love of goodwill. Love as goodwill cannot therefore be radically altruistic. If charity is one, there cannot possibly exist a conflict between love of self and love of neighbour. Expressions such as “disinterested” and “altruistic” seem to take from this fundamental truth about love as goodwill.

If we were to insist that love is disinterested, we could be led to a certain circularity without any real end. God created for love of us, but, as we ought to act for the good of others and not our own – love as goodwill being “quite free of self-interest” (LR 83) – we ought to act for God’s glory and not for our own happiness. We ought to love God for His sake and not for our own, and He would love us for our sake and not for His own. Love, therefore, it seems, would not find an ultimate end.

If, however, we affirm that God created and reveals principally for love of Himself, and that we ought to love Him, ourselves and our neighbour principally for love of Him, then our love can have ourselves or our neighbour as its object, but God will always remain the ultimate object, not only of His own love, but also of ours.

Maintaining that God created – which, of course, is an action ad extra – principally out of love for God and not principally for love of man, and adding, as our middle term, that we ought “to imitate God” (Ep 5:1), we can conclude that our acts ‘ad extra’, acts by which we love our neighbour, can and should, first and foremost, be acts of love of God, and, in second place, can and should be acts of love of self and then acts of love of neighbour.
As we have already seen, there is no other possibility. To love means to will the good for someone, and as the greatest goods are virtue and virtuous action, and as we can only will these immediately for ourselves (we are not able to substitute the act of willing of another person), it is necessary that we love ourselves most immediately and then love others in the sense of being beneficent, i.e. helping them towards virtue and virtuous action.

b) How St. Thomas understands Love as Goodwill

The view that we are expressing seems to be confirmed by St. Thomas. For him love is simply to will the good for someone: “Hoc enim est proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum.” We will now quote this text more fully in English and, thereby, see how the Angelic Doctor seems to place love of self as a presupposition of love of neighbour:

An act of love always tends towards two things: to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to will good for that person. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we will good for ourselves; and, so far as possible, union with that good. . . . And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself, and regards the good done to him as done to himself.  

This text of St. Thomas teaches very clearly that we can have amor benevolentiae for ourselves.  

In the Secunda Secundae St. Thomas asks: “Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?” This would seem impossible, as charity is a form of supernatural friendship which presupposes love between two persons. In the corpus of the article Aquinas gives a comprehensive answer:

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87 S.Th. I, q. 20, a. 1, ad. 3.
88 Cf. S.Th. I-II, q. 73, a. 9, c.: Here St. Thomas teaches that sins against oneself are more grevious than sins against one’s neighbour: “On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5: He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” This doctrine can only be based on the fact that it is most reasonable that we love ourselves before our neighbour.
89 S.Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 4.
90 Cf. S.Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 4, arg. 2.
I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above, we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. IV) that love is a unitive force, whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix. 4, 8, that the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves.\footnote{1}

From this paragraph we can make two points: strictly speaking man cannot be his own friend, friendship implies mutuality; however man can love himself. In fact love for oneself is more basic than love for another. St Thomas then moves on to another consideration:

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man’s friendship with God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.\footnote{2}

In succinct words we can say, just as we love our neighbour for God’s sake, we also love ourselves for God’s sake. These texts seem to confirm our difficulty in accepting Wojtyla’s position as proposed in Love and Responsibility, which portrays love as goodwill as altruistic and disinterested.

c) The Social Nature of Man and God’s Justice

In the academic year of 1955/56 Wojtyla, as part of his Lublin Lectures, analysed the ethical thought of Aristotle.\footnote{3} As we saw above, this seems to be the only place where he accepts that we can love ourselves with love of goodwill. In these lectures he makes specific reference to Book 9, Chapter 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics.\footnote{4} We believe that if greater attention had been given to this chapter, Wojtyla would have written with greater clarity on love of self.

\footnote{1} S.Th. II-II, q. 25, a. 4, c.
\footnote{2} Ibidem.
\footnote{4} Cf. ibidem, 138 and footnote 31 on page 154.
After having stated that “the good man should be a lover of self,” Aristotle goes on to give a most edifying commentary:

It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelve-month of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. . . . In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not.95

We quote from this chapter as it is referred to in the Lublin Lectures, but it does not seem to have formed the thought of Wojtyla as it could have. Even though it does not refer to man’s social nature, it is penetrated with this conviction: whatever man does for his friends or country is for his own best interest. Of such men, it can be said, that it is “a great prize that they choose for themselves.” In this sense “man should be a lover of self.” The self-love that is worthy of reproach is that which seeks “the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasure.”96 But such a man cannot be said to be “most of all a lover of self.”97 This title is reserved for the man who acts virtuously.

From a theological point of view, it is necessary to affirm that God, in His justice, will reward those who sacrifice temporal goods for the sake of virtue. The practice of virtue is always in one’s own best interest.

We will give what seems to be an extreme example of this. Let us imagine a Christian soldier who, through a refusal to practise the virtues of courage, justice and love, abandons his post when his country is at risk and thereby loses the opportunity of offering his life for his country. If he were to live for another 50 years and try to make amends by going to Mass and Holy Communion everyday of those 50 years, he would gain a lesser reward, than he would have, if he had laid down his life for his

96 Ibidem, p. 1086 [1168b 16-17].
97 Ibidem, p. 1087 [1168b 34].
country. By fulfilling God’s will we will gain the greatest reward. The justice of God demands this and this justice is related to the social nature of man.

God wants us to gain our reward through the practice of virtue, and this includes the social virtues. There can be no conflict between our own reward and the good of others. True self-love is ready to make sacrifices for the good of others and these sacrifices can be motivated by \textit{amor benevolentiae} for oneself. We participate in the \textit{amor benevolentiae} that God has for us. For this reason we love ourselves and are “self-interested” especially in reference to the greatest good of all, eternal life.

God’s desire to reward our good works and his desire that we do these works for the sake of our eternal reward are expressed in various passages of Scripture. Christ exhorts us to “lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where thieves do not break in and steal” (Mt 6:20).\textsuperscript{98} St. Paul tells us: “For he will render to every man according to his works: to those who by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life” (Rm 2:6-7).\textsuperscript{99} It is therefore licit to “seek for glory and honor and immortality” by “patience in well-doing.” St. Peter’s first letter talks of “the end to which your faith looks forward, that is, the salvation of your souls” (1 Pt 1:9 – \textit{JB}). Faith has as its end the salvation of our souls. If this is the God-given end of faith, it ought to be \textit{sought} as such and not, as it might be understood from some of Wojtyla’s later works, simply \textit{accepted}.

6. \textit{Love in The Theology of the Body}

We will now look to the \textit{Catechesis on the Human Body and on Human Love} of Pope John Paul II. It is well known that this Holy Father believed that classical philosophy could be complemented by phenomenology:

If we wish to speak rationally about good and evil, we have to return to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that is, to the philosophy of being. With the phenomenological method, for example, we can study experiences of morality, religion or simply what it is to be human, and draw from them a significant enrichment of our knowledge. Yet we must not forget that all these analyses implicitly presuppose the reality of the Absolute Being and also the reality of being human, that is, being a creature.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{99} Cf. \textit{ibidem}, 415-416.
All phenomenological analyses of “morality, religion or simply what it is to be human” have their value, but must be based on “the reality of Absolute Being and also on the reality of being human.”

In The Theology of the Body we will see that Pope John Paul II analyses with particular care the second account of the creation of man and states that, of the two accounts, this one helps us to penetrate into the original experience of man: “While Genesis 1 expresses this value [of man] in a purely theological (and indirectly metaphysical) form, Genesis 2, by contrast, reveals, so to speak, the first circle of experience lived by man as a value.”¹⁰¹ Later he returned to explain how the Yahwist text is a special source for understanding man’s original experience:

One can say that the analysis of the first chapters of Genesis forces us in some way to reconstruct the constitutive elements of man’s original experience. In this sense, the Yahwist text is by its own character a special source. When we speak of original human experiences, we have in mind not so much their distance in time, as rather their foundational significance. The important thing, therefore, is not that these experiences belong to man’s prehistory (to his “theological prehistory”), but that they are always at the root of every human experience.¹⁰²

In the same catechesis the Holy Father states: “The human experience of the body, as we discover it in the biblical texts quoted above, is certainly located on the threshold of all later ‘historical’ experience.”¹⁰³ While the “first account of the creation of man ... has a theological character” and “contains hidden within itself a powerful metaphysical content,”¹⁰⁴ the

¹⁰¹ John Paul II, GA of 14 November, 1979, in: Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, Boston 2006, n. 9-1, p. 162. Hereafter: Man & Woman will be abbreviated as Man & Woman. Our references to this volume will contain the number of the Catechesis and the number of the paragraph, as well as the page number. We will not mention the headings of the various Catecheses as they appeared in the L’Osservatore Romano. According to a letter of Archbishop Leonardo Sandri (Sostituto per gli Affari Generali della Segreteria di Stato), these headings “were added by the editorial offices of L’Osservatore Romano and are not part of the genuine Papal text”. Waldstein adds: “That the titles of individual catecheses are not part of the genuine papal text becomes further evident when one compares them in different language editions of OR”. He then gives samples of the varying translations in Italian, English, German and French. (Cf. Introduction by Michael Waldstein to Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, p. 6).


¹⁰³ Ibidem, n. 11-1, p. 170.

second account has a “depth [which] is above all subjective in nature and thus in some way psychological.”  

Comparing both accounts of creation Pope John Paul says: “We reach the conviction that this subjectivity corresponds to the objective reality of man created ‘in the image of God.’”

While it is interesting to note that not once during his entire *Catechesis on the Human Body and Human Love* did the Holy Father use the word “phenomenology” or the word “phenomenological,” he, as we have seen from the above quotations, shows a distinct interest in analysing the experience of our first parents.

We will now go on to examine how love is present in the second account of creation and in other parts of his catechesis. The Pope’s analysis seems to be a completion of what he taught about love as attraction and love as desire in *Love and Responsibility*. We will see that the first is, so to speak, the cause of the second. He does not talk about love as goodwill or benevolence in these catecheses, but we do find terms such as agape, love of friendship and disinterestedness which are most certainly related to love as goodwill. We will now look to ideas such as solitude, attraction, eros, desire and disinterestedness. However, certain elements of the Holy Father’s thought will be dealt with in the third article of this series, which will be dedicated to conjugal love.

**a) Original Solitude**

In the first account of creation we read: “God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (*Gn* 1:27). This account shows us the creation of Adam and Eve, as if it were, simultaneously. Within this context it is not possible to talk of solitude.

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106 *Ibidem*, n. 3-1, p. 139.

107 By using the “Find” feature on *Human Life International Pro-Life CD Library* (Front Royal: Human Life International, 2005), which contains the entire *Theology of the Body*, we discover that the words “phenomenology” and “phenomenological” are never used by the Holy Father. The concept “phenomenon” is used three times, its plural “phenomena” is used twice in the entire series. However, his use of the word “experience” and his desire to analyse the experience of our first parents seems to indicate that he is using what some might call a phenomenological method.
The second account of creation shows God creating Adam first and, only afterwards, it talks of the creation of Eve. It is for this reason that: “The problem of solitude shows itself only in the context of the second account of the creation of man.”

Before the creation of Eve, God brought all the animals to man to see what he would call them (cf. Gn 2:19). Pope John Paul states that precisely in this act of naming the animals “man gains the consciousness of his own superiority.” However, if Adam is superior to all other living beings he is necessarily “alone” – he is “alone” is his superiority.

As it was through physically seeing the animals that Adam became convinced of his superiority and his solitude, the Pope states:

The body, by which man shares in the visible created world, makes him at the same time aware of being “alone.” Otherwise he would not have been able to arrive at this conviction, which in fact he reached (as we read in Gen 2:20), if his body had not helped him to understand it, making the matter evident to him.

It was precisely by contemplating the bodily features of the animals that he was aware that “there was not found a helper fit for him” (Gn 2:20).

b) Attraction

It seems that Pope John Paul talks first of desire and only later of attraction in The Theology of the Body. He does not and cannot talk of love as desire because, as of yet, Adam has no one to love. Falling into his a deep sleep, Adam desires to find a being like himself: “In any case, in the light of the context of Genesis 2:18-20, there is no doubt that man falls into this ‘torpor’ with the desire of finding a being similar to himself.”

None of the living beings were capable of exercising a sufficient power of attraction over Adam. For this reason Adam was attracted to none. Consequently, he desires none as he felt he was capable of desiring.

The vital place of the body in love as attraction and love as desire will now come into focus:

The woman is made “with the rib” that God-Yahweh had taken from the man. Considering the archaic, metaphorical, and figurative way of expres-

\begin{enumerate}
\item[108] John Paul II, GA of 10 October, 1979, Man & Woman, n. 5-3, p. 147.
\item[109] Ibidem, n. 5-4, p. 148.
\item[110] John Paul II, GA of 24 October, 1979, Man & Woman, n. 6-3, p. 152.
\item[111] John Paul II, GA of 7 November, 1979, Man & Woman, n. 8-3, p. 159.
\end{enumerate}
sing the thought, we can establish that what is meant is the homogeneity of the whole being of both; this homogeneity regards above all the body, the somatic structure, and it is also confirmed by the man’s first words to the woman just created: “This time she is flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones” (Gen 2:23).112

While, on the one hand, the Pope insists that we are dealing with the “homogeneity of the whole being of both,” on the other, he states that this “homogeneity concerns above all the body, the somatic structure.” This is confirmed by Adam’s exclamation: “This time she is flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones” (Gen 2:23).

These words of Adam seem to contain both attraction and desire. In our analysis of Love and Responsibility we said that the object acts on the subject, so that the subject is attracted and is led to desire. Love as attraction represents the more passive element; love as desire represents the more active element.

Here we see how Eve “acted” on Adam. He “suffered” her influence; he was “passive” or “receptive” before her beauty and, therefore, began to experience love as desire. It is for this reason that “that first woman ‘formed with the rib taken from the man’ is immediately accepted as a help suited to him.”113

Only later, when the Pope goes on to meditate on Genesis 4:1-2, will he speak explicitly of woman’s attractiveness:

The whole exterior constitution of woman’s body, its particular look, the qualities that stand, with the power of perennial attraction, at the beginning of the “knowledge” about which Genesis 4:1-2 speaks (“Adam united himself with Eve”), are in strict union with motherhood.114

The “perennial attractiveness” of the woman is “at the beginning of the ‘knowledge,’” i.e. of marriage intimacy. Attractiveness is, therefore, a presupposition of love as desire.

However, we cannot limit attraction to the influence that the woman exercises on the man. Our author makes this point clearly in the following paragraph: “The fact that they became ‘one flesh’ is a powerful bond established by the Creator through which they discover their own huma-

112 JOHN PAUL II, GA of 7 November, 1979, Man & Woman, n. 8-4, p. 160.
113 Ibidem, n. 8-4, p. 161.
nity, both in its original unity and in the duality of a mysterious mutual attraction.”

When the Holy Father goes on to analyse purity according to the *Sermon on the Mount* he returns to the theme of attraction. After having spoken of the possibility of the human person remaining “only as an object of attraction, in some sense as it happens ‘in the world’ of living beings,” he went on to affirm that the sexual substratum of attraction should be referred to *communio personarum*: “However, already in the mystery of creation, what constituted the ‘natural,’ somatic, and sexual substratum of that attraction fully expressed the call of man and woman to personal communion.”

In a later catechesis the Pope, comparing attraction to lust, uses very elevated language:

On the one hand, the eternal attraction of man toward femininity (see Gen 2:23) frees in him—or perhaps it ought to free—a wide range of spiritual-carnal desires that are above all personal and “of communion” in their nature (see the analysis of the “beginning”) with a proportional hierarchy of values that corresponds to these desires. On the other hand, [lustful] “desire” limits this range and obscures the hierarchy of values characteristic of the perennial attraction of masculinity and femininity.

By talking of an “eternal” or “perennial” attraction, which “frees ... a wide range of spiritual-carnal desires that are above all personal and ‘of communion’ in their nature,” this Pope is clearly talking of an integrally human attraction and not merely a sensual attraction. All that is physical is destined to be integrated into that which is truly personal and truly human. The Pope ended the catechesis, now under consideration, by saying that it is through lust that “the woman ceases to exist as a subject of the eternal attraction.” Here we see how lust or carnal desire perverts man’s capacity to be attracted to the full beauty of the female person. She “is deprived of the meaning of her attraction as a person” and becomes “a mere object for the man,” i.e. something less than she actually is by her ontological constitution and by her vocation to *communio personarum*.

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117 *Ibidem*.
Later he goes on to show how “reciprocal attraction” passes through “unity of flesh” to “union-communion of persons”:

In the biblical narrative (above all in Gen 2:23-25), which doubtless attests to the reciprocal attraction and the perennial call of the human person—through masculinity and femininity—to that “unity of flesh,” which at the same time should realize the union-communion of persons.\(^\text{121}\)

Both “reciprocal attraction” and “unity of flesh” are clearly at the service of the realization of communio personarum.

c) The Concept “Eros”

We will now study the concept of “eros” in the catecheses of Pope John Paul II. We do so at this point as it seems, in a certain sense, to unite in itself both attraction and desire. On the whole, our author follows the idea of Plato in his use of this concept, which, as he himself says, has a “vast range of meanings that differ from each other in a nuanced way.”\(^\text{122}\)

We now offer the Pope’s explanation of Plato and immediately will see how he then makes this position his own: “According to Plato, ‘eros’ represents the interior power that draws man toward all that is good, true, and beautiful. This ‘attraction’ indicates, in this case, the intensity of a subjective act of the human spirit.”\(^\text{123}\) In the same catechesis our author talks of eros as “the inner power that ‘attracts’ man to the true, the good and the beautiful.”\(^\text{124}\) In the next catechesis he simply says that eros “implies the upward impulse of the human spirit toward what is true, good and beautiful.”\(^\text{125}\)

Even though, at first glance, it might seem that eros is more attraction than desire, a closer reading of these three quotations seems to verify that it is actually more desire than attraction. It seems very evident that “the interior power that draws man” is a force within man himself, and it is not the beauty of the beloved by which man is attracted. Eros as attraction refers to “the intensity of a subjective act of the human spirit.” This clearly implies that eros is a movement towards the good. This movement is in fact desire or in the Pope’s own words an “upward impulse of the human spirit.”


\(^\text{122}\) Ibidem.

\(^\text{123}\) Ibidem.

\(^\text{124}\) Ibidem, n. 47-5, p. 318.

spirit toward what is true, good and beautiful.” Thus eros seems to be very close to St. Thomas’ hope or magnitude as we already saw when we examined *Love and Responsibility*.

Eros is, of course, closely associated with that which is erotic in the sense of sexual desire. In this context the Holy Father introduces the concept of “ethos” which he simply defines as “that which is ‘ethical.’”

126 Earlier he had stated that ethos “embraces in its content the complex spheres of good and evil that depend on the human will and are subject to the laws of conscience and the sensitivity of the human ‘heart.’”

127 In the next catechesis he follows this up by affirming: “It is, therefore, indispensable that ethos becomes the constitutive form of eros.”

128 In this way “what is ‘erotic’ also becomes true, good and beautiful.”

The position of Pope John Paul can be summed up in the following manner: *erotic desires ought to be integrated into eros* (which is an aspiration for all that is good, true and beautiful); *both of these ought to have ethos* (that which is ethical) as their constitutive form. In this way man will, in fact, discover and live “the spousal meaning of the body and the true dignity of the gift in what is ‘erotic.’”

130 Through the concepts of “erotic,” “eros,” and “ethos” we come back to what we already saw, namely, that the “unity of flesh” must be put at the service of “the union-communion of persons.”

d) Desire

As we have seen above, it is through his body that man becomes aware of his superiority and his solitude. It is also through the beauty of Eve’s body that he is attracted and desires. However, this attraction and desire is not reduced to mere bodily or physical realities. Very early on in *The Theology of the Body* the Holy Father talks about man’s becoming the *image of God* through *communio personarum*. Speaking of original solitude he says that it “presents itself to us ... as the discovery of an adequate relationship ‘to’ the person, and thus as opening toward and waiting for a ‘communion of persons.’”


129 *Ibidem*.

130 *Ibidem*.


for a communion of persons the Pope is clearly referring to a desire for such a communion and, thus, prepares us for man’s becoming the image of God through communion:

Man becomes the image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion. He is, in fact, “from the beginning” not only an image in which the solitude of one Person, who rules the world, mirrors itself, but also and essentially the image of an inscrutable divine communion of Persons.  

We are beginning to see how somatic attractiveness and somatic desire are integrated into communio personarum. The theme of communio will be developed in the third article of this series.

In our studies so far we have seen that for Pope Wojtyla desire can refer to man’s aspiration for all that will truly perfect him as a person. However, desire, understood as “the concupiscence ‘that comes from the world,’” has the effect of limiting. It “limits and deforms this objective mode of existing of the body, in which man has come to share.” He goes on to say: “The human ‘heart’ experiences the degree of this limitation or deformation above all in the sphere of the reciprocal relations between man and woman.” What Karol Wojtyla calls “using” in Love and Responsibility seems to be presented in The Theology of The Body as “limitation,” “distortion,” and “reduction.” For this reason he will say:

It is only when the intentional reduction explained above drags the will into its narrow horizon, when it awakens in it a decision for a relation with another human being (in our case with the woman) according to the scale of values proper to “concupiscence,” it is only then that one can say that “desire” has gained mastery over the “heart.”

One no longer desires union with the other according to a true communio personarum, but according to what we might call communio concupiscentiae. The person and communion with the person has been reduced or narrowed to one of its dimensions. This, the Pope insists, does not harmonise with the original attraction:

Such a “reduction” of the rich content of reciprocal and perennial attraction among human persons in their masculinity and femininity does not cor-

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135 Ibidem.
respond to the “nature” of the attraction in question. Such a “reduction,” in fact, extinguishes the meaning proper to man and woman, a meaning that is personal and “of communion,” through which “the man will...unite with his wife and the two will be one flesh” (Gen 2:24). “Concupiscence” removes the intentional dimension of the reciprocal existence of man and woman from the personal perspectives “of communion,” which are proper to their perennial and reciprocal attraction, reducing this attraction and, so to speak, driving it toward utilitarian dimensions, in whose sphere of influence one human being “makes use” of another human being, “using her” only to satisfy his own “urges.”

In this dense passage Pope John Paul II shows how lust and reduction leads to “using” the other person and, we could add, allowing oneself to be “used” by the other person. This does not reflect the original attraction, which is to the person and not only one dimension of the person. This, in turn, must lead to a destruction of communio personarum.

Many other passages could be quoted, but we believed that we have shown that “attraction,” “eros,” and “desire” in their most original senses refer to the person and to a true communio personarum. Being attracted to and actively desiring such a communio is based on solitude, on man’s experience of needing “a helper fit for him” (Gn 2:20). All reduction of this desire to one specific area threatens true communio and, thereby, threatens the human person’s reflection of the communio personarum of the Holy Trinity.

If, on the other hand, bodily attraction is integrated into personal attraction, if the erotic is subject to eros, and if bodily desire is “overshadowed by” personal longing (cf. LR 81), if, in a more Thomistic language, the passion of desire is integrated into magnanimity or theological hope, everything that God created and saw to be “very good” (Gn 1:31) will find its true place in communio personarum. Personal love will be an image of divine love and, as we will see later, the sexual expression of personal love will be looked on as an “echo” or “reflection” of divine communion.

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e) Disinterestedness

1) Disinterestedness in The Theology of the Body

We now go on to examine the concept of “disinterestedness” in *The Theology of the Body*. While there are a number of passages that could be interpreted in the sense of *acting (loving the other) without a view to one’s own personal good*, on the whole it seems that we can understand “disinterestedness” as *love for love’s sake and not for the sake of bodily pleasure*.

We will first look to a number of passages where it seems that the idea exposed in *L’uomo nel campo della responsabilità* might be still be present. This idea was expressed in his explanation of Kant’s view of disinterestedness:

In fact, in his opinion all so called hypothetical norms, all norms of the kind: “if you want to arrive at X you should do Y” do not have an ethical character and do not define a moral duty, but contain a form of utilitarianism (let us say of interest). The ethical norm should define a disinterested duty. We can and we should accept all this.\(^{138}\)

This formulation, as we explained above,\(^ {139}\) seems to give the impression that we ought not to perform good actions for the sake of the reward, but should accept the reward that is related to the good actions. In this sense Wojtyla continued by saying: “But it is difficult to accept the opinion according to which disinterested duty, as duty for duty’s sake (*Pflicht aus Pflicht*), is without an objective or is a-teleological.”\(^ {140}\) The reward is, therefore, connected to the good act, but the good act is not done for the sake of the reward.

One passage where such an idea might still be present is the following:

The good that the one who loves creates with his love in the beloved is like a test of that same love and its measure. Giving himself in the most disinterested way, the one who loves does not do so outside the limits of


\(^{139}\) Cf. (above) Section 4.3: “Disinterestedness in *L’uomo nel campo della responsabilità*” !!!colocar referncia de página XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX!!!!!

this measure and of this verification.\textsuperscript{141}

By speaking of giving himself in the “most disinterested way” he seems to imply that, in giving himself, man does not do so for the sake of this own perfection or reward. His sole motive is the good of the other. His own perfection and his reward would, therefore, be accepted rather than aimed at.

It should, however, be noted that in this catechesis the Pope affirms: “In some sense, love makes the ‘I’ of another person one’s own ‘I.’”\textsuperscript{142} From this it could be argued that just as we desire that the other receive his or her reward, we also desire it for ourselves. In this sense, we could love ourselves by being sincerely interested in our eternal reward and having this as a motive in all our actions. This catechesis of the Pope seems to be open to such an interpretation.

While still commenting on Genesis, and while talking explicitly of “the disinterested gift of oneself,” Pope John Paul II wrote:

This gift allows both the man and the woman to find each other reciprocally, inasmuch as the Creator willed each of them “for his own sake” (see \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, 24:3). In the first beatifying encounter, the man thus finds the woman and she finds him. In this way he welcomes her within himself (and she welcomes him within herself), welcomes her as she is willed “for her own sake” by the Creator, as she is constituted in the mystery of the image of God through her femininity; and, reciprocally, she welcomes him in the same way, as he is willed “for his own sake” by the Creator and constituted by him through his masculinity.\textsuperscript{143}

This passage seems to give the best possible explanation of what is called “disinterested love.” In it we see that each person ought to be treated as willed by God, as willed “for its own sake.”\textsuperscript{144} Love recognises that each person is \textit{an end} in him or herself and should be loved as such. Because of this, one should be prepared to do the good for another, even if this were of absolutely no personal advantage to oneself.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{John Paul II}, GA of 1 September, 1982, \textit{Man & Woman}, n. 92-4, p. 484.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Ibidem}, n. 92-6, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Gaudium et Spes}: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (1965), in: \textit{Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents}, Collegeville 1975, n. 24, p. 925: “It follows, then, that if man is the only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake, man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself (cf. Lk. 17:33).”
When talking about the virtue of continence as the “capacity to contain bodily and sensual reactions” and as “the capacity to control and guide man’s whole sensual and emotive sphere,” Pope John Paul returns to the theme of disinterestedness:

In the case under discussion, it is a question of the ability both to direct the line of arousal toward its correct development, and also to direct the line of emotion by orienting it toward the deepening and inner intensification of its “pure” and, in a certain sense, “disinterested” character.\(^\text{145}\)

Here it is a question of directing excitement and the emotion of love to their pure and in a certain sense, disinterested character. In this context, the context of “continence [that] develops the personal communion of man and woman,”\(^\text{146}\) disinterestedness seems best understood as not seeking (being interested in) bodily pleasure as an end in itself, but as putting it at the service of communio personarum.

This same meaning appears to be present when the Holy Father talks of how the beloved in The Song of Songs is called “sister.” The term “sister,” he says, “seems to express, in a more simple way, the subjectivity of the female ‘I’ in personal relationship with the man.” He goes on to say: “The fact that they feel like brother and sister allows them to live their reciprocal closeness in security and to manifest it, finding support in this closeness, and not fearing the negative judgement of other men.”\(^\text{147}\) There exists, therefore, a relationship into which the element of sensual desire has not yet entered. In this context our author talks of a “disinterested tenderness”:

Through the appelation “sister,” the bridegroom’s words tend to reproduce, I would say, the history of the femininity of the beloved person; they see her still in the time of girlhood and embrace her entire “I,” soul and body, with a disinterested tenderness.\(^\text{148}\)

As tenderness is often associated with sensual desires, the Pope talks here of a “disinterested tenderness,” i.e. a tenderness that does not have

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\(^{146}\) Ibidem, n. 130-5, p. 652.

\(^{147}\) John Paul II, GA of 30 May, 1984, in: *Man & Woman*, par. 3, p. 567. Michael Waldstein draws our attention to the fact that not all the Catecheses prepared by Pope John Paul II were actually given (Cf. *Man & Woman*, p. 548, * Translators note). Following Waldstein’s method of presentation, we will not give the number and paragraph of these particular Catecheses, but will give the date and paragraph.

sensual pleasure as its goal. Such “disinterested tenderness” serves to prepare man for marriage (where the woman passes from being a “sister” to being a “bride”) and for the integration of sensual desire into one’s desire for communio personarum.

We can resume the findings of this subsection by saying that disinterestedness seems to have three possible meanings in The Theology of the Body:

1. It may refer to not having reward as the aim of loving another.
2. It can refer to that disposition which enables one to do the good for another, even if this were of absolutely no personal advantage to oneself.
3. It refers to loving, not for the sake of sensual pleasure, but for the sake of the true good of the other.

2) The Theology of the Body in the Light of Veritatis Splendor

Of the three above-mentioned meanings of disinterestedness, the first needs to be eliminated if one takes into consideration the Pope’s teaching in Veritatis Splendor. It should first be observed that the entire first chapter of this Encyclical Letter has as its leitmotiv the question that the rich young man directed to Jesus: “Teacher, what good must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt 19:16). The young man obviously has as his end the obtaining of eternal life. He wants to perform actions in view to gaining this reward. Jesus does not reprimand him for having such an end. In fact, Jesus replies by affirming: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17). Jesus, thereby, confirms this man’s motivation, i.e. his performing of good acts for the sake of entering the Kingdom of God. From this we can say that our heavenly reward is not simply to be accepted; it is to be aimed at. In the light of Jesus’ reply to the young man, such an attitude cannot be reproached for lacking in “disinterestedness.”

149 JOHN PAUL II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor: The Splendor of Truth (= VS), Boston 1993. The first chapter of Veritatis Splendor is entitled: “Teacher, What Good Must I Do...?” (Mt 19:16). This title does not refer explicitly to eternal life. However, throughout this chapter (and later on in the Encyclical) this question comes back and its second part, which refers to the motive of good action, “to have eternal life”, is included. Cf. nn. 6, 8 (as heading of this number); nn. 9, 25, 72, 73.

150 This response of Jesus is often quoted in this Encyclical. Cf. VS: nn. 9, 12 (as heading of this number and in text); nn. 72, 73.
In fact, nowhere does this Encyclical speak of a lack of disinterestedness in those who perform good acts for the sake of their eternal reward. On the other hand, there are many passages which indicate that the Christian does indeed act with a view to his eternal reward. When speaking of the Beatitudes, the Encyclical says: “These latter are above all promises, from which there also indirectly flow normative indications for the moral life.”\(^{151}\) The promised reward is, so to speak, the principal element; the normative indication, which points to how we should act, is derived from the promise.

When talking of *The Moral Act*\(^ {152}\) Pope John Paul II returns to the essential connection between the moral value of an act and man’s final end:

The first question in the young man’s conversation with Jesus: “What good must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt 19:6) immediately brings out the essential connection between the moral value of an act and man’s final end. Jesus, in his reply, confirms the young man’s conviction: the performance of good acts, commanded by the One who “alone is good,” constitutes the indispensable condition of and path to eternal blessedness: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17). Jesus’ answer and his reference to the commandments also make it clear that the path to that end is marked by respect for the divine laws which safeguard human good. *Only the act in conformity with the good can be a path that leads to life.*\(^ {153}\)

There is an essential, and therefore God-willed, connection between good acts and eternal life. To want to do good for the sake of obtaining eternal life is to profoundly respect the order established by God. In fact, the great good that God wants for us is eternal life. However, He wants us to freely obtain this supreme good through good acts. It is for this reason that we do good in order to obtain eternal life.

Within the same section the Holy Father talks of the teleological character of the moral life: “Consequently the moral life has an essential ‘teleological’ character, since it consists in the deliberate ordering of human acts to God, the supreme good and ultimate end (telos) of man.”\(^ {154}\) Here, it should be noted that the human act is ordered not simply to man’s happiness, but to God as the end of man. God’s glory is in fact the

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\(^{151}\) *VS*, n. 16.

\(^{152}\) Cf. *VS*, nn. 71-83.

\(^{153}\) *VS*, n. 72.

\(^{154}\) *VS*, n. 73.
end/goal of human life. If man strives for his own eternal happiness, he ought to do so for the glory of God.

Pope John Paul II ends this Encyclical by referring to the path by which man ought to pursue happiness:

No absolution offered by beguiling doctrines, even in the areas of philosophy and theology, can make man truly happy: only the Cross and the glory of the Risen Christ can grant peace to his conscience and salvation to his life.155

*Veritatis Splendor* began with the young man’s desire to know the path to eternal life. It ends by indicating that we ought to seek eternal happiness through the Cross and Resurrection of Christ. What is implicit throughout the entire Encyclical is that genuine self-interest, in the sense of pursuing one’s own best (supernatural) interests, through performing acts that are objectively good, is essential to the Christian life.

These quotations and considerations clearly show that it is good for the human person to perform good acts for the sake of eternal life. This is the most definitive and authoritative position of Pope John Paul II. We cannot, therefore, interpret *disinterestedness* as meaning: we ought not to do the good for the sake of the reward, but should simply accept the reward for the good acts we have done merely for their own sake. The earlier affirmations of our author are open to such an interpretation, but since the publication of *Veritatis Splendor* in 1993, such an interpretation is no longer possible.

f) Joy as a Fruit of Love

We have already seen the difference between sexual and personal attraction, sexual and personal desire, and carnal and personal love. In each case we see a dichotomy. In their fruit we will also see one. Sexual attraction and desire can only lead to sexual pleasure. Personal attraction and desire necessarily lead to true joy. Once the person is free from false loves, true joy is the result:

Interiorly free from the constraint of their bodies and of sex, free with the freedom of the gift, man and woman were able to enjoy the whole truth, the whole self-evidence of the human being, just as God-Yahweh had revealed it to them in the mystery of creation.156

155 VS, n. 120.
Before the fall, Adam and Eve “were able to enjoy the whole truth, the whole self-evidence of the human being.” So it was before the fall, and so it can be if man and woman do not allow themselves to be led by mere sensual desires. A later catechesis confirms this truth:

Analogously, as far as the sphere of immediate reactions of the “heart” is concerned, sensual arousal is quite different from the deep emotion with which not only inner sensibility but also sexuality itself reacts to the integral expression of femininity and masculinity.157

It is, therefore, a case of experiencing a more complete joy and not a mere bodily pleasure. Bodily pleasure is termed as “excitement,” which is obviously passing. Reacting “to the total expression of femininity and masculinity” involves a “deep emotion,” i.e. a more authentically human joy.

When commenting on *The Song of Songs*, Pope John Paul talks of the joy of being with the other in a metaphorical way:

The truth of the increasing closeness of the spouses through love develops in the subjective dimension “of the heart,” of affection and sentiment, and this truth allows one to discover the other in itself as a gift and, in some sense, to “tasting him” within oneself.158

Here we see that, in the dimension of the heart, man can discover his wife as a gift, and even “taste” this gift, i.e. enjoy the totality of the personal gift that he experiences with his wife, and she can enjoy the fulness-of-gift that she experiences with her husband. True gift-of-self leads to true joy. This is even felt at an emotional level.

The joy that the spouses experience is not however complete joy. Rather it opens them to an ever new search:

In the Song of Songs, the “language of the body” is inserted in the singular process of the reciprocal attraction of the man and the woman, which is expressed in the frequent refrains speaking of the search full of longing, of affectionate care (see Song 2:7), and of the spouses’ mutual rediscovery (see Song 5:2).159

In this passage the Holy Father talks of “the reciprocal attraction,” which “is expressed in the frequent refrains speaking of the search full of longing,” and which leads the spouses’ to a “mutual rediscovery.” He

immediately goes on to affirm: “This brings them joy and calm, and seems to lead them to a continual search.”

The spouses “mutual rediscovery” brings “joy and calm,” but it also “seems to lead them to a continual search.” Authentic joy flows from authentic desire, but, as we see, it is not a complete joy:

One has the impression that in encountering each other, reaching each other, experiencing closeness to each other, they ceaselessly continue to tend toward something:

This search-aspiration has its interior dimension, “the heart is awake” even in sleep. This aspiration born from love on the basis of the “language of the body” is a search for integral beauty, for purity free from every stain; it is a search for perfection that contains the synthesis of human beauty, beauty of soul and body.

The “joy” felt is not a complete joy. It is rather a joy that stimulates one to continue searching. It is as if the one who desires (and desires with the freedom of gift, i.e. free from the compulsion of body and sex) discovers that there is a depth that escapes him. In his search, he not only discovers the beauty of his beloved and the beauty of being a gift, but also discovers that there is more to be discovered.

When looking at desire we saw how the Holy Father explained sexual desire or lust in terms of “limitation,” “distortion,” and “reduction.” Lust not only limits a man’s vision at any given moment, but it also makes him blind for a deeper vision. True personal desire has the opposite effect. It not only opens one to a more complete vision at any given moment, but it also brings with it a conviction that one can come to an ever deeper vision. It therefore entails “a search for integral beauty, for purity free from every stain; a search for perfection that contains the synthesis of human beauty, beauty of soul and body.”

Reading the language of the human body in all its authenticity opens one to a search for perfection, understood in terms of integral human beauty, a beauty that can only lead to joy.

The last mention that we find of joy in The Theology of the Body is within the context of reverence for the work of God. Such respect

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160 Ibidem.


involves overcoming “the inner constraint of concupiscence directed toward the other ‘I’ as an object of enjoyment.”\textsuperscript{164} Within the context of such respect “deep satisfaction” is possible:

The attitude of reverence for the work of God, which the Spirit stirs up in the spouses, has an enormous significance for those “affective manifestations,” because it goes hand in hand with the capacity for profound pleasure in, admiration for, disinterested attention to the “visible” and at the same time “invisible” beauty of femininity and masculinity, and finally a profound appreciation for the disinterested gift of the “other.”\textsuperscript{165}

It is the Holy Spirit who grants us “respect for the work of God” and “side by side with it [this respect] there is the capacity for deep satisfaction.” Deep satisfaction or deep joy is associated with love that is truly human and, ultimately, with respect for God’s work that the Holy Spirit stirs up in the couple...

**Concluding Synthesis**

We conclude this article by observing that, early on, Karol Wojtyla seemed to show little fear of writing on self-love and did so without reducing this to love of desire. Later on and especially in Love and Responsibility, he writes that the purest form of love is love as goodwill and that this is altruistic. This love is therefore disinterested.

However, a close reading of his more anthropological studies, with special attention to self-determination and the intransitive effect of human action, seems to reveal that we do in fact love ourselves with love as goodwill, and this self-love is prior to love of our neighbour.

In the fifth section of this first chapter we appealed to philosophical and theological arguments in order to establish that amor benevolentiae is, in fact, directed towards oneself before it is directed outward towards others. We believe this point is of absolute importance if we are to come to a more complete understanding of married love. Such love, in a very real sense, can be based on a true love of self. This love of self, in the case of the human person, must of course have love of God as its most profound base.

In the sixth section of this chapter we turned our attention to The Theology of the Body and also appealed to the vision of Veritatis Splendor.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibidem, n. 132-3, p. 656.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibidem, n. 132-4, p. 657.
This allowed us to affirm that disinterested love, within the context of relationship between the sexes, refers to a love that seeks the true human good and does not have as its end the “using” of the other person as a means to obtaining the maximum of sexual pleasure.

Through our appeal to *Veritatis Splendor*, which is one of the most authoritative documents that we quoted in this article, we saw that the most definitive position of Pope John Paul II does not allow us to state that it is a-moral or immoral to perform good acts for the sake of obtaining a reward. As God wants us to perform all our acts in view of eternal life, we ought to have this motive. True self-interestedness, therefore, is a necessary part of the Christian life.

We conclude by saying that love of goodwill must have as its object not only the good of the other, but also one’s own good. For this reason it cannot be described as radically altruistic. Man can enter marriage motivated more by love of himself, than by love of his future wife. And this love can be most justifiably called *amor benevolentiae, love as goodwill.*

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